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PUBLIC EDUCATION, RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT,
AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGNt
FRANcis J. BECKWITH*
In 1987, in Edwards v. Aguillard, the United States Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a Louisiana statute (the Bal-
anced-Treatment Act) that required the state's public schools to
teach Creationism if evolution was taught and to teach evolution
if Creationism was taught.' That decision was the culmination of
a series of court battles and cultural conflicts that can be traced
back to the famous Scopes Trial of 1925 in Dayton, Tennessee.2
Although many thought, and continue to think, that Edwards
ended the debate over the teaching of origins in public schools, a
t This article is adapted from FRANCISJ. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLI-
GENT DESIGN (2003).
* Research Fellow, James Madison Program in American Ideals and Insti-
tutions, Department of Politics, Princeton University (2002-2003); Associate
Professor of Church-State Studies, and Associate Director of the J.M. Dawson
Institute for Church-State Studies, Baylor University; Ph.D. in Philosophy, M.A.
in Philosophy, Fordham University; MJ.S., Washington University School of
Law, St. Louis.
1. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
2. RONALD L. NUMBERS, DARWINISM COMES TO AMERICA 76-91 (1998);
EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA'S
CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997); STEPHEN GOLDBERG,
CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA 69-83 (1994); EDWARDJ. LARSON,
TRIAL AND ERROR: THE AMERICAN CONTROVERSY OVER CREATION AND EVOLUTION
(1985); THE WORLD'S MOST FAMOUS COURT TRIAL; STATE OF TENNESSEE V. JOHN
THOMAS SCOPES: COMPLETE STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE FAMOUS COURT TEST
OF THE TENNESSEE ANTI-EVOLUTION ACT, AT DAYTON, JULY 10 TO 21, 1925,
INCLUDING SPEECHES AND ARGUMENTS OF ATrORNEYS, TESTIMONY OF NOTED
SCIENTISTS, AND BRYAN'S LAST SPEECH (1971); RAY GINGER, Six DAYS OR FOR-
EVER?: TENNESSEE V. JOHN THOMAS SCOPES (1958); R.M. Cornelius, Their Stage
Drew All the World: A New Look at the Scopes Evolution Trial, TENN. Q., Summer
1981, at 15; see also Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927), and Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down on establishment grounds Arkan-
sas statute that forbade the teaching of evolution in public schools, for the pro-
hibition was based on evolution's inconsistency with the Genesis-account of
origins, a religious point of view); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp.
1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (striking down on establishment grounds Arkansas stat-
ute that required public schools to offer balanced-treatment of evolution and
creationism, because the definition of"creationism" is transparently identical to
the Genesis-account of origins, a religious point of view).
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new movement, made up of largely well-educated and well-
credentialed scholars, has given it new life.
The main thrust of this new movement, known as Intelligent
Design (ID),' is that intelligent agency, as an aspect of scientific
theory-making, has more explanatory power in accounting for
the specified, and sometimes irreducible, complexity of some
physical systems, including biological entities, and/or the exis-
tence of the universe as a whole, than the blind forces of
unguided and everlasting matter.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an answer to the
following question: Given the Supreme Court's holding in
Edwards, current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and the
nature of ID, would ID pass constitutional muster if it were per-
mitted or required by a government entity to be part of a public
school's curriculum? In order to answer that question, we must
first present the case for ID.
I. THE RISE OF, AND CASE FOR, INTELLIGENT DESIGN
Among the scholars affiliated with ID are Phillip E. John-
son,4 William Dembski,5  Alvin Plantinga,6 J.P. Moreland,7
Michael Behe,8 Dean Kenyon,9 Dallas Willard,' 0 Stephen C.
3. For a diversity of perspectives on ID's history and publications, see
NUMBERS, supra note 2, at 15-21; Barbara Forrest, Intelligent Design Creationism's
'Wedge Strategy, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS: PHILO-
SOPHICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (Robert T. Pennock ed.,
2001) [hereinafter INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM]; John Angus Campbell,
Intelligent Design, Darwinism, and the Philosophy of Public Education, 1 RHETORIC &
PUB. APE. 469 (1998); William A. Dembski, The Intelligent Design Movement, Cos-
MIC PURSUIT, Spring 1998, available at http://www.arn.org/docs/dembski/wd_
idmovement.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy); Thomas M. Lessel, Intelligent Design: A Look at Some of the Relevant Litera-
ture, 1 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 671 (1998).
4. Jefferson E. Peyser Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, Univer-
sity of California (Retired Spring 2001); J.D., University of Chicago.
5. Associate Research Professor in the Conceptual Foundations of Sci-
ence, Baylor University; Ph.D in Mathematics, University of Chicago; Ph.D in
Philosophy, University of Illinois, Chicago. Dr. Dembski has also done postdoc-
toral work in mathematics at Cornell University and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, in physics at the University of Chicago and in computer science
at Princeton University.
6. John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame;
Ph.D in Philosophy, Yale University.
7. Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Biola University; Ph.D in Philos-
ophy, University of Southern California.
8. Professor of Biological Sciences, Lehigh University; Ph.D in Biochemis-
try from the University of Pennsylvania.
9. Professor of Biology, San Francisco State University; Ph.D in Biophys-
ics, Stanford University. Dr. Kenyon has been a National Science Foundation
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Meyer," Walter Bradley,12 Hugh Ross,' 3 David Berklinski,' 4 Paul
Nelson, 1" Henry F. Schaefer III,16 Jonathan Wells,' 7 William
Lane Craig, 8 and Robert Kaita. 9 The works of these and other
ID scholars have been published by prestigious academic
presses20 and respected academic journals.21 These works have
Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of California-Berkeley, a visiting scholar to
Trinity College, Oxford University, and a postdoctoral fellow at NASA-Ames
Research Center.
10. Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California; Ph.D in
Philosophy, University of Wisconsin.
11. Ph.D in History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University.
12. Professor of Mechanical Engineering, Texas A & M University; Ph.D
in Materials Science, University of Texas-Austin.
13. Ph.D in Astronomy, University of Toronto. Dr. Ross was a post-doc-
toral fellow at the California Institute of Technology for five years.
14. Ph.D in Math, Princeton University. Dr. Berklinski has been a post-
doctoral fellow in mathematics and molecular biology at Columbia University.
15. Ph.D in Philosophy of Biology, University of Chicago.
16. Graham Perdue Professor of Chemistry and Director of the Center
for Computational Quantum Chemistry, University of Georgia; Ph.D in Chemi-
cal Physics, Stanford University. Dr. Schaefer has been nominated for the
Nobel Prize several times.
17. Ph.D in Molecular and Cell Biology, University of California-Berkeley;
Ph.D in Religious Studies, Yale University. Dr. Wells has done postdoctoral
research at the University of California-Berkeley, and has taught biology at Cali-
fornia State University-Hayward.
18. Research Professor of Philosophy, Biola University; Ph.D in Philoso-
phy, University of Birmingham (U.K.); D. Theol., University of Munich.
19. Principal Research Physicist, Plasma Physics Laboratory, Princeton
University; Ph.D in Physics, Rutgers University. Dr. Kaita teaches in Princeton
University's department of astrophysical sciences.
20. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, No FREE LUNCH: WHY SPECIFIED COM-
PLEXITY CANNOT BE PURCHASED WITHOUT INTELLIGENCE (2002) [hereinafter
DEMBSKI, No FREE LUNCH]; DEL RATZSCH, NATURE, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN: THE
STATUS OF DESIGN IN NATURAL SCIENCE (2001); NATURALISM: A CRITICAL ANALY-
SIS (William Lane Craig &J.P. Moreland eds., 2000); WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE
DESIGN INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998)
[hereinafter DEMBSK], THE DESIGN INFERENCE]; MICHAEL BEHE, DARWIN'S BLACK
Box: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO EVOLUTION (1996) [hereinafter DAR-
WIN'S BLACK Box]; WILLIAM LANE CRAIG & QUENTIN SMITH, THEISM, ATHEISM,
AND BIG BANG COSMOLOGY (1993); see also DEBATING DESIGN: FROM DARWIN TO
DNA (William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse eds., forthcoming 2004); DARWIN-
ISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (John A. Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer
eds., forthcoming 2003); PAUL A. NELSON, ON COMMON DESCENT.
(forthcoming).
21. See, e.g., Michael J. Behe, Self-Organization and Irreducibly Complex Sys-
tems: A Reply to Shanks and Joplin, 67 PHIL. OF SCI. 155 (2000); Paul A. Nelson, Is
'Intelligent Design' Unavoidable-Even By Howard Van Till?: A Response, 34 ZYGON
677 (1999); William A. Dembski & Stephen C. Meyer, Fruitful Interchange or Polite
Chitchat?: The Dialogue Between Science and Theology, 33 ZYGON 415 (1998); Wil-
liam A. Dembski, Randomness by Design, 25 NotOs 75 (1991); William Lane Craig,
Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design, 39 BRIT. J. FOR THE
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PHIL. OF ScI. 389 (1989); William Lane Craig, God, Creation and Mr. Davies, 37
BRIT. J. FOR THE PHIL. OF Sci. 163 (1986);John Leslie, Anthropic Principle, World
Ensemble, Design, 19 AM. PHIL. Q. 141 (1982).
Because ID's project strikes at the philosophical core of evolutionary the-
ory-its unchallenged epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions-ID
proponents have published most of their pro-ID essays in peer-reviewed periodi-
cals that specialize in the philosophy of science or in anthologies produced by
respected university presses. In addition, as shown in the previous note, ID
proponents have made significant inroads in publishing monographs with pres-
tigious presses. The ID movement has found more success in these venues
rather than in traditional scientific journals, for the latter typically do not have
reviewers and editors adequately trained to assess the soundness of argu-
ments-both empirical and philosophical-that challenge the core presupposi-
tions of an entrenched paradigm.
However, design theorists' publication in biology peer-reviewed journals is
thin, and cannot be entirely attributed to hostile editorial boards who want to
suppress ID (though that sometimes is the case). According to a personal email
from Dembski,
I would say there are two things going on: (1) Much of biological
research is frankly engineering (genetic engineering, molecular
machines, etc.) and thus already frameable in ID terms; the problem is
that Darwinists are framing this work in Darwinian terms, seeing the
Darwinian mechanism as the great engineer of biology. Thus work
that should be considered design-theoretic research has been co-
opted for a materialist agenda. (2) We are just getting off the ground
with a biological research program that is uniquely design-theoretic
(i.e., which cannot be co-opted by Darwinians). The number of
researchers who can see how to employ design-theoretic concepts to
inspire fruitful biological research is merely a handful.
Email from William A. Dembski, to FrancisJ. Beckwith (July 10, 2002) (on file
with author). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that ID opponents are mistaken
when they claim that design theorists have not published peer-reviewed works.
However, as a matter of constitutional law, the Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., held that "[t]he fact of publication (or lack
thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not disposi-
tive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an opinion is premised." Peer review publication,
according to the Court, "is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not neces-
sarily correlate with reliability . . . and in some instances well-grounded but
innovative theories will not have been published." 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
Those viewpoints that "are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest"
may suffer the same fate. Id. at 593-94. In Daubert the Court rejected the
widely-held evidentiary standard of the D.C. Circuit case, Frye v. United States: a
scientific opinion is reliable and therefore admissible if it is generally accepted
within the scientific community. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The
Supreme Court held in Daubert that the Frye standard, "absent from, and
incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in fed-
eral trials." This, of course, does not mean that there are no standards by which
to assess scientific opinion; rather, it means that polling scientists, though rele-
vant, is no longer sufficient or necessary. According to the Court, "[p]roposed
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,'
based on what is known." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. That is, "the requirement
that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a stan-
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also received attention, including critical assessment, by the
wider academic and research community22 as well as the popular
21press.
Although the ID movement is far from monolithic, there are
particular strands of thought within the movement, and types of
arguments by its proponents, that are important for the purpose
of assessing whether teaching ID in public schools would pass
constitutional muster. We will look at two strands of ID that are
relevant to this assessment: (A) The Case Against Methodological
Naturalism, and (B) The Case for Intelligent Design. I will con-
clude this section with a brief overview of some other concerns
and arguments that have arisen in the debate over ID. Because
the literature supporting ID is sophisticated, vast and growing,
my presentation of its case will be cursory.
dard of evidentiary reliability." Id. at 589-90. This means that "the test of scien-
tific legitimacy comes from the validation of the empirical research supporting
the evidence." David K. DeWolf et al., Teaching the Origins Controversy: Science, or
Religion, or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 39, 77 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594). It
is, very simply and sensibly, a matter of arguments and their soundness and not
a matter of popularity.
22. See, e.g., INTELLIGENT DESIGN CRATIONISM, supra note 3; ROBERT T.
PENNOCK, TOWER OF BABEL: THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE NEW CREATIONISM
(1999); Brian Fitelson et al., How Not to Detect Design, PHIL. OF Sci. 66 (1999);
Niall Shanks & Karl H. Joplin, Redundant Complexity: A Critical Analysis of Intelli-
gent Design in Biochemistry, PHIL. OF Scl. 66 (1999); HowardJ. Van Till, Does "Intel-
ligent Design" Have a Chance? An Essay Review, ZYGON 34 (1999); Bruce H.
Weber, Irreducible Complexity and the Problem of Biochemical Emergence, BIOLOGY &
PHIL. 14 (1999); Symposium, The Intelligent Design Argument, RHETORIC & PUB.
AFF. 1 (1998); Neil W. Blackstone, Argumentum Ad Ignorantam, Q. REV. OF BIOL-
OGY 72 (1997); Robert Dorit, Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to
Evolution, 85 AM. SCIENTIST 474 (1997) (reviewing DARWIN'S BLACK Box, supra
note 21), available at http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/Leads97/
Darwin97-09.html (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy); H. Allen Orr, Darwin v. Intelligent Design (Again), 21 BOSTON REV. (Dec.
1996-Jan. 1997), available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/br21.6/orr.html (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); J.A. COYNE,
God in the Details, NATURE 383 (1996).
In 2000 both Baylor University (The Nature of Nature: An Interdisciplinary
Conference on the Role of Naturalism in Science, Baylor University, Apr.
12-15, 2000) and Yale University (Science and the Evidence for Design in the
Universe, Yale University, Nov. 2-4, 2000) hosted major conferences on ID.
The American Museum of Natural History (New York City) in April 2002,
presented as part of its lecture series a public discussion entitled, Evolution or
Intelligent Design?: Examining the Intelligent Design Issue, at http://www.amnh.org/
programs/lectures/index.html?src=p.h# (on file with the Notre Dame Journal
of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
23. See Beth McMurtrie, Darwinism Under Attack, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Dec. 21, 2001, at 4; James Glanz, Biologists Face a New Theory of Life's Ori-
gins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at 1; Teresa Watanabe, Enlisting Science to Find the
Fingerprints of a Creator, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2001, at Al.
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A. The Case Against Methodological Naturalism
ID proponents maintain that there is a fundamental reason
why evolution2 4 seems to most scholars in the humanities and
sciences to be the only real legitimate explanation for the origin
of the universe and life: a prior commitment to methodological
naturalism (MN), "the view that science must be restricted solely
to undirected natural processes . "..."25 According to Phillip
Johnson, "[a] methodological naturalist defines science as the
search for the best naturalistic theories. A theory would not be
naturalistic if it left something out (such as the existence of
genetic information or consciousness) to be explained by a
supernatural cause." Therefore, "all events in evolution (before
the evolution of intelligence) are assumed attributable to unin-
telligent causes. The question is not whether life (genetic infor-
mation) arose by some combination of chance and chemical
laws, to pick one example, but merely how it did so."2 6 Thus,
according to design theorists, once one defines science as a disci-
pline that allows only naturalistic explanations, and if one main-
tains that science is the only field that provides truth on the
24. What I mean by evolution is naturalistic evolution, the view that the
entire natural universe, including its living organisms in all their complexities
and differences and apparent designs, can be accounted for by strictly material
processes (such as natural selection) without resorting to any designer, Creator,
or non-material entity or agent as an explanation. That is, an exhaustive mate-
rialist description of the natural universe and an accounting of the entities in it,
including living organisms, is in principle possible. Therefore, to say that evolu-
tion is true-as understood by its leading proponents-is to say that naturalism
(or materialism) as a worldview is true, for the former entails the latter, for the
latter is a necessary condition of the former. Consequently, to challenge that
necessary condition-by appealing to something even as modest as Intelligent
Design (to say nothing of full-blown Creationism)-poses a threat to the mate-
rialist edifice. However, by attempting to rebut this threat-by taking on the
arguments for ID-evolutionists implicitly accept the first, and most important
premise, of the ID movement. That is, evolution provides an answer to the very
same question ID provides an answer: What is the origin of apparent design in
biological organisms and/or other aspects of the natural universe and/or the
universe as a whole? Evolution answers the question by appealing exclusively to
the forces of unguided matter (and/or energy), the latter includes intelligent
agency as a legitimate cause that may account for some apparently natural phe-
nomena. But if this is the case, then the legal grounds for teaching ID in public
schools, as we shall see, are strengthened, for it would mean that an origins
curriculum that excludes design and offers to students naturalism as the only
approved metaphysical position of the state may itself run afoul of the Establish-
ment Clause.
25. WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SCI-
ENCE AND THEOLOGY 119 (1999).
26. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, REASON IN THE BALANCE: THE CASE AGAINST NAT-
URALISM IN SCIENCE, LAw & EDUCATION 208 (1986).
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question of origins, then evolution must be true even if there are
many unanswered questions that seem incapable of being ade-
quately addressed under the evolutionary paradigm. Thus, ID
proponents maintain that what should be a rigorous intellectual
debate has become, in the hands of more hostile partisans, a
question-begging street fight over metaphysical turf. This is why
ID proponents maintain that MN is a necessary presupposition
for the veracity of the evolutionary edifice and entails ontological
materialism (OM) as a worldview,2" but is arguably not necessary
for the practice of science qua science. 9"
How do ID supporters critique MN? Or more properly, why
would they want to? After all, it seems as though science, as we
all learned in high school and college, deals exclusively with nat-
ural causes and explanations. Sneaking in "God" or some disem-
bodied intelligence to account for a particular phenomenon
seems to most of us like a science-stopper that cheats us out of a
real account of what happened. This "God-of-the-gaps" strategy,
as it is pejoratively called, is the antithesis of good science, and
hence, any talk of non-natural, non-material accounts of natural
phenomena immediately elicits the accusation that such talk is
27. "Ontological materialism," which I will employ interchangeably with
the terms "naturalism," "philosophical naturalism," "scientific materialism," and
"materialism," is the view that the natural universe is all that exists and all the
entities in it can be accounted for by strictly material processes. Thus, if science
is the paradigm of knowledge (as is widely held in our culture), and it necessa-
rily presupposes methodological naturalism, then ontological materialism is the
only worldview for which one can have "knowledge."
Although for the purposes of this essay, the terms "naturalism" and "mate-
rialism" are employed interchangeably, they are not necessarily synonymous.
As Moreland points out, "[One could be a naturalist without being a physical-
ist [or materialist], say by embracing Platonic forms, possibilia, or abstract
objects like sets, and one can be a physicalist [or materialist] and not a natural-
ist (e.g., if one held that God is a physical object)." J.P. Moreland, Theistic Sci-
ence & Methodological Naturalism, in THE CREATIONISM HYPOTHESIS: SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE FOR AN INTELLIGENT DESIGNER 50 (J.P. Moreland ed., 1994). However,
in this essay, materialism and naturalism (or philosophical naturalism) are
treated as synonymous terms.
28. See generally DEMBSKI, supra note 25, at 97-183; JOHNSON, supra note
26, at 205-18; Moreland, supra note 27; Jonathan Wells, Unseating Naturalism:
Recent Insights from Developmental Biology, in MERE CREATION: SCIENCE, FAITH &
INTELLIGENT DESIGN (William A. Dembski ed., 1998) [hereinafter MERE CREA-
TION]; Alvin Plantinga, Methodological Naturalism?, ORIGINS & DESIGN 18 (1997),
available at http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/odl81/methnatl81.htm (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); Phillip E. John-
son, Dogmatic Materialism, BOSTON REV., Feb.-Mar. 1997, available at http://
www.polisci.mit.edu/bostonreview/br22.1/johnson.html (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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the disreputable "God-of-the-gaps" strategy. 29 Thus, it seems to
many that MN is a necessary condition for science to function
properly.
However, design theorists argue that there may be times at
which an intelligent designer better accounts for certain phe-
nomena than do material causes. And if that is the case, then the
naturalist's appeal to possible future materialist accounts of the
phenomena is driven, not by the data, but by MN and thus is a
type of "naturalism-of-the-gaps." 3° Design theorists, as we shall
see, do not employ intelligent design as a mere "gap" when all
natural explanations fail. But rather, they present criteria that
they believe are useful in detecting and falsifying design.
(Whether such criteria actually work, of course, is another ques-
tion entirely).
29. "God-of-the-gaps," the philosophical equivalent of Lochnerizing in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, is said to occur when a scientist, unable to
develop a natural explanation for an observation or event, resorts to God or
some other supernatural agency or power as an explanation. When the scientist
or a future scientist discovers a natural explanation, God is no longer needed to
fill the gap and so is discarded as an explanation. So, according to conven-
tional wisdom, a God-of-the-gaps strategy short circuits scientific investigation.
For analyses of this problem, see John Mark Reynolds, God of the Gaps: Intelligent
Design & Bad Apologetic Advice, in MERE CREATION, supra note 28, at 313-31, and
Moreland, supra note 27, at 59-60.
It should be noted, however, that the reason why the God-of-the-gaps is
disreputable is because it has been used to explain unknown physical mecha-
nisms (e.g., perturbed orbits of planets), just the sorts of things for which
agency seems particularly inadequate to explain. As Dembski writes:
The "gaps" in the [g]od-of-the-gaps objection are meant to denote
gaps of ignorance about underlying physical mechanisms. But there is
no reason to think that all gaps give way to ordinary physical explana-
tions once we know enough about the underlying physical mecha-
nisms. The mechanisms simply do not exist. Some gaps might
constitute ontic discontinuities in the chain of physical causes and
thus remain forever beyond the capacity of physical mechanisms.
DEMBSKi, No FREE LUNCH, supra note 20, at 334-35. Hence, if a "gap"-that is,
an apparently contranomic event that cannot be accounted for by material
mechanisms-exemplifies phenomena whose properties, in other contexts, we
typically attribute to design, then it is unclear why attributing the "gap" to intel-
ligent agency compromises the pursuit for truth. After all, it may be true that
materialism is false.
30. I originally used this term, "naturalism-of-the-gaps," in my Ph.D disser-
tation which was published as a book. FRANcis J. BECKWITH, DAVID HUME'S
ARGUMENT AGAINST MIRAcLES: A CRITICAL ANALysIs 76 (1989). I describe
Hume's a priori rejection of miracle-claims as an "ad hoc naturalism-of-the-gaps."
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Because the critiques of MN in the ID literature are sophisti-
cated and plentiful,3" there is no way I can present all the argu-
ments, or even detailed presentations of some of them, in this
paper. However, the key premise behind most of these critiques
is the correct observation that MN is not a claim of science-e.g.,
Einstein's Theory of Relativity-but a claim about natural science.
According to Moreland, the claim that natural science must
adopt MN is a "second-order philosophical" claim "about sci-
ence."32 That is, the question of whether MN is necessary for
natural science is a philosophical claim that must be justified
philosophically; it cannot be justified by natural science, if it is
alleged to be a presupposition for the practice of natural science.
No doubt natural science assumes certain preconditions, some of
which appear to be essential to its practice. But none of them is
derived from science; they are philosophical presuppositions that
make science possible.
In addition, other ID proponents maintain that certain phil-
osophical arguments-e.g., arguments for a substance view of
persons, the existence of an immaterial first cause, the existence
of moral properties, and the possibility of rationality itself 3-
reveal the weaknesses of both MN and OM.
Thus, the real question, according to design theorists, is
whether their arguments for ID work, not whether ID conflicts
with MN or OM. After all, if the ID arguments work and they
conflict with MN, then one may conclude, quite reasonably, that
MN is not a necessary precondition of natural science after all
and that an a priori commitment to OM cannot be employed to
exclude positions contrary to it. For to exclude non-materialist
(or ID) accounts of natural phenomena by merely defining sci-
ence as requiring MN (and/or entailing OM) does not count
either as a philosophical argument against ID or an argument for
MN (or OM); it is at best, circular reasoning, and at worst, intel-
lectual imperialism.
31. See generally NATURALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYsis, supra note 20; DEMBSKI,
supra note 25, at 97-183; JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 205-18; Wells, supra note
28; Johnson, supra note 28; Plantinga, supra note 28; Moreland, supra note 27.
32. See Moreland, supra note 27, at 43.
33. See generally id.; FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, AND PUBUC
EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT
DESIGN ch. 3, pt. A, § 3 (2003); NATURALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIs, supra note 20;
J.P. Moreland, Creation Science and Methodological Naturalism, in MAN AND CREA-
TION: PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY (Michael Bauman ed., 1993).
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B. The Case for Intelligent Design
In addition to challenging methodological naturalism,
design theorists present a positive case for their position. At the
core of the ID research program is its criteria by which its propo-
nents claim they can detect or falsify design. William A. Dembski
proposes one such criterion. He proposes an explanatory filter
to detect specified complexity (SC), something that we recognize in
many fields as evidence of intelligent agency, e.g., "forensic sci-
ence, intellectual property law, insurance claims investigation,
cryptography, and random number generation." 4 Thus, what
Dembski suggests is not something unknown to the world of sci-
ence. Rather what he and his colleagues in the ID movement
propose is that we extend these insights, which have proved so
fruitful in other fields, to the world of the natural sciences.
Why specified complexity? According to Dembski,
"[w]henever we infer design, we must establish three things-
contingency, complexity and specification. Contingency, by which we
mean that an event was one of several possibilities, ensures that
the object is not the result of an automatic and hence unintelli-
gent process."3 5 In other words, an event that is not contingent
is one that can be completely accounted for by natural law (or an
algorithm). To cite an example, a salt crystal "results from forces
of chemical necessity that can be described by the laws of chemis-
try. A setting of silverware is not." 6 The place setting is contin-
gent, for there are no laws of chemistry or physics which direct
the knife and spoon to the right side of the plate and the fork to
the left. In other words, a contingent event cannot be reduced
to natural law.
"Complexity," writes Dembski, "ensures that the object in
question is not so simple that it can readily be explained by
chance."3" For Dembski, "complexity . . . is a form of
probability.""8 For example, the improbability of opening a com-
bination lock by chance depends on the complexity of the mech-
anism. The more complex the mechanism, the greater the
34. William A. Dembski, Reinstating Design Within Science, 1 RHETORIC &
PUB. AFF. 506 (1998) [hereinafter Dembski, Reinstating Design]. For more
sophisticated defenses of the explanatory filter, see DEMBSK, No FREE LUNCH,
supra note 20, at 1-37; DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE, supra note 20; William
A. Dembski, The Third Mode of Explanation: Detecting Evidence of Intelligent Design
in Science, in 9 SCIENCE & EVIDENCE FOR DESIGN IN THE UNIVERSE 17 (MichaelJ.
Behe et al., contribs., 2000) [hereinafter Dembski, The Third Mode].
35. Dembski, The Third Mode, supra note 34, at 25.
36. Id. at 26.
37. Id. at 25-26.
38. Id. at 27.
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improbability that one will be able to open the lock by chance.
Therefore, "the greater the complexity, the smaller the
probability. Thus to determine whether something is sufficiently
complex to warrant a design inference is to determine whether it
has sufficiently small probability."39 Nevertheless, complexity by
itself may not be design. For example, a random selection of
1,000 symbols (rtvwix%*<3q498d .... ) and the result of 1,000
coin flips are complex and improbable, but can be explained by
randomness or chance. This is why specification is essential.
"Specification ensures that this object exhibits the type of
pattern that is the trademark of intelligence."'") Specificity by
itself may not be design. For example, redundant order, such as
the beating of a pulsar or the earth's orbiting of the sun every
365 days, can be explained by law .and necessity. However, if
specification is combined with complexity, a design inference
may be warranted. Dembski offers an example from one area of
science, the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence (SETI).
SETI researchers, in their attempt to detect intelligence outside
earth, have developed a filter that has certain pre-set patterns so
that it may discard radio waves that do not exhibit specified com-
plexity. In the novel (authored by Carl Sagan) and movie ver-
sions of Contact, SETI researchers detect extraterrestrial
intelligence when they discover a sequence of beats and pauses
that correspond to the prime numbers from 2 to 101. 4'
Dembski makes a distinction between specification and
fabrication. The latter occurs when one infers a pattern ad hoc
after the fact even though chance and necessity may account for
the pattern. For example,42 suppose a hurricane moves through
my neighborhood, destroying four out of the seven homes on my
street, and the three homes not destroyed are owned by me and
my two brothers. Moreover, my brothers and I own the second,
fourth, and sixth homes on the block, which means that the hur-
ricane destroyed only the odd-numbered homes. Suppose I were
to infer from this pattern either that the hurricane intentionally
spared the property of the Beckwith boys and/or that the hurri-
cane did not like odd-numbered homes on my block. This
design inference would not be warranted since the "pattern" may
be adequately accounted for by chance and necessity and thus is
ad hoc. On the other hand, the pattern detected by the SETI
researchers in Contact is not a fabrication. It is an instance of SC
39. Id.
40. Dembski, Reinstating Design, supra note 34, at 508.
41. Id. at 507-09.
42. This is my example, not Dembski's.
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because it is not only highly complex and improbable, but it has
specification, a pattern that is independent of, or detachable from,
the event it explains. That is to say, the pattern is one that is not
derived exclusively from the event-as is the ad hoc pattern read
back into the hurricane example-but one we could construct
even if we did not know which one of the possible events would
occur. Thus, my winning the lottery with eight randomly
selected numbers, though the outcome of a highly complex pro-
cess with a result that is antecedently improbable, is not detacha-
ble, for it does not exhibit a pattern one could have constructed
if one did not know which numbers would have been chosen.
On the other hand, the pattern of the message from space in
Contact is detachable, for our background knowledge (or side
information, as Dembski calls it)4" about binary arithmetic pro-
vides us the resources by which we can construct this pattern
independent of the message itself. As a researcher in the movie
Contact exclaimed, "This isn't noise, this has structure."'' In
other words, the message is not merely complex with an improb-
able random pattern, but has "structure," a pattern that one
could have constructed independent of the message itself (as the
SETI researchers evidently assumed when they constructed their
pre-set patterns in a way that would not discard patterns that
exhibited specified complexity). According to Dembski, "It]his
distinction between specifications and fabrications can be made
with full statistical rigor."45
There are at least three ways in which design theorists
employ Dembski's filter in order to detect design in nature:46 the
43. See Dembski, The Third Mode, supra note 34, at 47-51 n.17.
44. CONTACT (Warner Bros. 1997), quoted in Dembski, Reinstating Design,
supra note 34, at 509.
45. Dembski, Reinstating Design, supra note 34, at 510; see DEMBSKI, No
FREE LUNCH, supra note 20, at 45-110.
46. The U.S. Supreme Court, in at least one case, has applied a similar
type of filter in order to detect intentional racial discrimination. Wo v. Hopkins
concerned an ordinance in San Francisco that required the approval of the
Board of Supervisors for operating a laundry in a wooden building. 118 U.S.
356 (1886). (A permit was not necessary if the laundry was in a brick or stone
building). According to Gerald Gunther and Kathleen Sullivan, "[t]he Board
granted permits to operate laundries in wooden buildings to all but one of the
non-Chinese applicants, but to none of about 200 Chinese applicants. A Chi-
nese alien who had operated a laundry for many years was refused a permit and
imprisoned for illegally operating a laundry." KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 750 (13th ed. 1997). Even though the ordi-
nance was facially neutral, its administration was discriminatory, for, according
to the Court, intentional discrimination was the best explanation of the pattern
of the Board's granting of permits. To employ Dembski's language, chance and
necessity could not account for the specified complexity found in the pattern of
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irreducible complexity of certain biological systems, the informa-
tion content found in DNA, and the fine-tuning of the universe
for the existence of life.
1. Irreducible Complexity of Certain Biological Systems
Behe takes seriously Darwin's claim that "[i]f it could be
demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not
possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modi-
fications, my theory would absolutely break down."4 7 Thus, a sys-
tem that is irreducibly complex (IC) is a serious challenge to the
explanatory power of Darwin's theory of natural selection.4 8 Behe
defines an IC system as "a single system of several well-matched,
interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein
the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effec-
excluding every single Chinese applicant. It is contingent (i.e., it is one of many
possibilities), complex (i.e., it involves numerous applicants from different
racial groups with buildings made of different materials), and specified (i.e., a
pattern that one would construct if one had the goal of discriminating against
Chinese applicants).
47. Michael Behe, Intelligent Design as an Alternative Explanation for the Exis-
tence of Biomolecular Machines, 1 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 566 (1998) (quoting
CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 154 (6th ed. 1872)). The contem-
porary popularizer of Darwinism, Richard Dawkins, agrees, "Evolution is very
possibly not, in actual fact, always gradual. But it must be gradual when it is
being used to explain the coming into existence of complicated, apparently
designed objects, like eyes. For if it is not gradual in these cases, it ceases to
have any explanatory power at all." RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN 83
(1995).
48. Arguing from what he observed occurs when domestic breeders
engage in selection, Darwin offered natural selection as the engine by which spe-
cies adapt, survive, acquire new characteristics, and pass them on to their
offspring:
Owing to this struggle, variations, however slight and from whatever
cause proceeding, if they be in any degree profitable to an individual
of any species, in its infinitely complex relations to other organic
beings and to external nature, will tend to the preservation of that
individual, and will generally be inherited by the offspring. The off-
spring, also, will thus have a better chance of surviving, for, of the
many individuals of any species which are periodically born, but a
small number can survive. I have called this principle, by which each
slight variation, if useful, is preserved by the term of Natural Selection,
in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection. We have
seen that man by selection can certainly produce great results, and can
adapt organic beings to his own uses, through the accumulation of
slight but useful variations, given to him by the hand of Nature. But
Natural Selection, as we shall hereafter see, is a power incessantly
ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to man's feeble
efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art.
CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 61 (1964) (1859).
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tively cease functioning."4 9 A mechanical mousetrap is an exam-
ple of such a system. Writes Behe:
The mousetraps my family uses consist of a number of
parts... : (1) a flat wooden platform to act as a base; (2) a
metal hammer, which does the actual job of crushing the
mouse; (3) a wire spring with extended ends to press
against the platform and the hammer when the trap is
charged; (4) a sensitive catch which releases when slight
pressure is applied; and (5) a metal bar that connects to
the catch and holds the hammer back when the trap is
charged. (There are also assorted staples to hold the sys-
tem together).5 °
The trap will not function if any one of its components (the
base, hammer, spring, catch, or holding bar) is removed.
Because an IC system has no function until all its parts are in
place, it cannot be accounted for by gradual changes over time,
for according to natural selection a biological entity must have
some function so that it may exist, change, and pass that change
on to its progeny. But with IC systems, there can be no function-
ing intermediate forms that have yet to acquire the requisite
parts, for IC systems are irreducible and cannot be the legacy of
intermediate forms. Thus, as Behe points out, "If there is no
function, selection has nothing to work on, and Darwinian evolu-
tion is thwarted.'
Behe cites a number of examples of irreducibly complex
biological systems including those contained within the cell.
One of the cell's molecular machines is the cilium. 52 Behe
explains that in order for the cilium to work a number of compo-
nents are needed. Writes Behe:
Ciliary motion certainly requires microtubles; otherwise,
there would be no strands to slide. Additionally, it requires
a motor, or else microtubles of the cilium would lie stiff
49. BEHE, supra note 20, at 39.
50. Id. at 42.
51. Behe, supra note 47, at 567. There is controversy surrounding Behe's
mousetrap example. See, e.g., Orr, supra note 22; John H. McDonald, A Reduci-
bly Complex Mousetrap, available at http://udel.edu/-mcdonaldmousetrap.html
(last revised Oct. 1, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics
& Public Policy). However, I do not believe that these critiques of Behe's illus-
tration fundamentally undercut his argument for the irreducible complexity of
actual biological systems. For a response to these critiques as well as a fine-
tuning of Behe's case, see DEMBSKI, No FREE LUNCH, supra note 20, at 256-67,
279-89.
52. In addition to the cilium, Behe includes the bacterial flagellum, the
mechanism of blood clotting, vesicular transport, and immune systems as exam-
ples of irreducibly complex biological systems.
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and motionless. Furthermore, it requires linkers to tug on
neighboring strands, converting the sliding motion into a
bending motion, and preventing the structure from falling
apart. All of these parts are required to perform one func-
tion: ciliary motion. Just as the mousetrap does not work
unless all of its constituent parts are present, ciliary motion
simply does not exist in the absence of microtubles, con-
nectors, and motors. Therefore we can conclude that the
cilium is irreducibly complex-an enormous monkey
wrench thrown into its presumed gradual, Darwinian
evolution.
53
Behe notes in his 1996 book that among the more than one
thousand essays on the cilium that have appeared in the major
journals in biochemistry published between 1975 and 1995,
only two articles even attempted to suggest a model for the
evolution of the cilium that takes into account real
mechanical considerations. Worse, the two papers disa-
gree with each other even about the general route such an
evolution might take. Neither paper discusses crucial
quantitative details, or possible problems that would
quickly cause a mechanical device such as a cilium or
mousetrap to be useless. 54
Consequently, reviewers of Darwin's Black Box, "admit[ted] the
current lack of Darwinian explanations," even though most
"expressed confidence that in the future such explanations will
be found.
55
Behe does not share this optimism. Rather, he argues that
the data are more consistent with an ID explanation. He sug-
gests this explanation, not from ignorance, but because he main-
tains that we do have legitimate criteria by which to detect design
(e.g., SC), and that an IC system exhibits the characteristics these
criteria are meant to detect. It is contingent (i.e., it is one of
many possibilities; Darwinian algorithms cannot account for it),
complex (i.e., it involves numerous systems, sub-systems, and
parts), and specified (i.e., patterns of biological systems and sub-
systems a capable intelligence would have constructed if it
intended to bring about certain functions in an organism).
53. BEHE, supra note 20, at 64-65.
54. Id. at 68.
55. Behe, supra note 47, at 569.
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2. The Information Content Found in DNA
Stephen C. Meyer provides another case for design: an argu-
ment from the information content of DNA.5 6 Since the arrival
of Darwin's The Origin of Species, a number of theories have been
proposed, and experiments conducted, in order to provide a
wholly naturalistic account of the initial conditions that gave rise
to life.5 7 Meyer argues that none of these theories or experi-
ments has succeeded.5 8 But even if they did succeed in account-
ing for the chemistry of life, Meyer maintains that a wholly
naturalistic explanation cannot account for the information con-
tent of DNA or the increase of information that is supposed to
have occurred over time through natural selection resulting in
the highly complex organisms with which the earth is now
teeming.
According to Meyer, "[m]odern molecular biology has
revealed that living cells-the fundamental units of life-possess
the ability to store, edit, and transmit information and to use
information to regulate their fundamental metabolic
processes."59 Unlike physical structures that are the result of sci-
entific laws and/or chance-e.g., crystals, snowflakes, a home
destroyed by a hurricane-DNA has information content that
has the earmarks of specified complexity. An ice crystal, in con-
trast, is highly ordered with no information content, for it is the
result of the redundant order of the chemical composition of its
constituent parts. Concerning DNA, Meyer writes:
As in the case of protein, the sequence specificity of the
DNA molecule strongly resembles the sequence specificity
of human codes or languages. Just as the letters in the
alphabet of a written language may convey a particular
message depending on their sequence, so too do the
sequences of nucleotides or bases in the DNA molecule
convey precise biochemical messages that direct protein
synthesis within the cell.... Thus the sequence specificity
in DNA begets sequence specificity in proteins. Or put dif-
ferently, the sequence specificity of proteins depends upon
56. Stephen C. Meyer, DNA By Design: An Inference to the Best Explanation for
the Origin of Biological Information, 1 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 519-56 (1998); Ste-
phen C. Meyer, The Explanatory Power of Design: DNA and the Origin of Information,
in MERE CREATION, supra note 28, at 113-47 [hereinafter Meyer, The Explanatory
Power]; see also DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 20; Ste-
phen C. Meyer, DNA and the Origin of Life: Information, Specification and Explana-
tion, in DEBATING DESIGN: FROM DARWIN TO DNA, supra note 20.
57. Meyer, The Explanatory Power, supra note 56, at 113-19, 122-34.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 113-14.
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a prior specificity-upon information-encoded in
DNA.6 °
Meyer critiques naturalistic attempts to account for this. He
argues that self-organization scenarios (theories based on neces-
sity) and chance hypotheses (theories based on randomness or
chance) are simply incapable of accounting for the specified
complexity of the information content of DNA. Both types of
theories might account for either order or complexity, but they
cannot account for the specified complexity of information.6 '
To employ an example,62 the laws of physics can account for the
constituent parts of the tiles that contain the letters in a Scrabble
game. Chance in combination with the law of gravity can
account for the random arrangement of the tiles after they hit
the floor following an earthquake that knocks them off the din-
ing room table. But only an intelligent agent can account for
some of the letters appearing together as a coherent message on
my computer table: "go to the store and buy some chicken."
Meyer concludes that the best explanation for the specified
complexity, the information content, of DNA is intelligent
design. After all,
[w]e know from experience that intelligent agents create
information all the time. Indeed, experience teaches that
whenever high information content is present in an artifact
or entity whose causal story is known, invariably creative
intelligence-design-has played a causal role in the ori-
gin of the entity. Moreover, citing the activity of an intelli-
gent agent really does explain the origin of certain features
such as, for example, the faces on Mount Rushmore or the
inscriptions on the Rosetta Stone. (Imagine the absurdity
of an archaeologist who refused to infer an intelligent
cause for the inscriptions on the Rosetta Stone because
such an inference would constitute a scribe-of-the-gaps fal-
lacy.) Inferences to design need not depend upon our
ignorance, but instead are often justified by our knowledge
of the demonstrated causal powers of nature and agency,
respectively. Recent developments in the information sci-
ences formalize this knowledge, helping us to make infer-
ences about the causal histories of various artifacts, entities
or events based upon the information-theoretic signatures
they exhibit .... Thus knowledge (albeit provisional) of
established cause-effect relationships, not ignorance, justi-
60. Id. at 121-22.
61. Id. at 126-34.
62. This is my example, not Meyer's.
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fies the design inference as the best explanation for the
origin of biological information in a prebiotic context.6"
Consequently, according to Meyer, it is virtually impossible
that unguided chemistry could produce the information-rich
DNA molecule, which functions like a written text or machine
code. Like the communication sent by the aliens in the book
and movie versions of Contact, and like the signals the real-life
SETI's pre-set filter is programmed not to exclude, the informa-
tion content of DNA exhibits specified complexity and thus can-
not be accounted for by either chance or necessity. It is
contingent (i.e., it is one of many possibilities; Darwinian algo-
rithms cannot account for it), complex (i.e., it has the character-
istics of a written text or machine code), and specified (i.e., it is a
pattern a capable intelligence could have constructed if it
intended to store, edit, and pass on information in living orga-
nisms). In the words of Darwinian Richard Dawkins, "The
machine code of the genes is uncannily computer like."6 4 And,
as computer software mogul Bill Gates puts it, "DNA is like a
computer program, but far, far more advanced than any software
we've ever created. 65
3. The Fine-Tuning of The Universe For The Existence of
Human Life.
In the 1960s some physicists began making the observation
that our universe appears to have been fine-tuned for the exis-
tence of human life.6 6 During the 1980s and 1990s a number of
works have assessed this "anthropic coincidence" in differing
ways.67 According to Meyer, these scientists "discovered that the
63. Meyer, The Explanatory Power, supra note 56, at 139 (citation omitted).
64. DAWKINS, supra note 47, at 17.
65. BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 228 (rev. ed. 1996).
66. Karl W. Giberson, The Anthropic Principle, 9 J. OF INTERDISC. STUD. 63
(1997).
67. See generally GILLES COHEN-TANNOUDJI, UNIVERSAL CONSTANTS IN PHYS-
ics (Patricia Thickstun trans., 1993); HUGH Ross, THE CREATOR AND THE COS-
MOS (1993); REINHARD BREUER, THE ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE (Harry Newman &
Mark Lowery trans., 1991); HUGH Ross, THE FINGERPRINT OF GOD: RECENT SCI-
ENTIFIC DISCOVERIES REVEAL THE UNMISTAKABLE IDENTITY OF THE CREATOR (2d
ed. 1991); JOHN GRIBBIN & MARTIN REES, COSMIC COINCIDENCES (1989); JOHN
LESLIE, UNIVERSES (1989); JOHN BARROW & FRANK TIPLER, THE ANTHROPIC COS-
MOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE (1988); PAUL DAVIES, SUPERFORCE (1984); PAUL DAVIES,
THE ACCIDENTAL UNIVERSE (1982); Walter L. Bradley, The just So' Universe: The
Fine-Tuning of Constants and Conditions in the Cosmos, in SIGNS OF INTELLIGENCE:
UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENT DESIGN (William A. Dembski &James M. Kushiner
eds., 2001); Hugh Ross, Big Bang Refined By Fire, in MERE CREATION, supra note
28 [hereinafter Ross, Big Bang Refined by Fire]; Hugh Ross, Astronomical Evidences
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existence of life in the universe depends upon a highly improba-
ble but precise balance of physical factors. The constants of
physics, the initial conditions of the universe, and many other of
its features appear delicately balanced to allow for the possibility
of life."68 Any slight alteration in these constants would have
made human life impossible. For example, there would have
been no life in the universe if the rate of the universe's expan-
sion had been faster or slower, the strength of gravitational
attraction had been stronger or weaker, or Planck's constant had
had a different value.69 These, of course, are not the only char-
acteristics of the universe that had to be in place to make life
possible. In 1998 astrophysicist and design advocate Hugh Ross
estimated that there are "twenty-nine characteristics of the uni-
verse that must be fine-tuned for any kind of physical life to be
possible" and that our solar system has forty-five characteristics
that are necessary for human life to arise in it.7° Given the indi-
vidual and collective probabilities for these characteristics to all
arise by chance with precisely the correct values to make human
life possible, Ross estimates that there is "[m]uch less than one
chance in one hundred billion trillion trillion trillion [that
there] exists .. .even one" planet on which life "would occur
anywhere in the universe."71 This is why Nobel laureate in phys-
ics, Arno Penzias, writes that "astronomy leads us to a unique
event, a universe which was created out of nothing, and delicately
balanced to provide exactly the conditions required to support
life. In the absence of an absurdly-improbable accident, the
observations of modern science seem to suggest an underlying,
one might say, supernatural plan."'7 2
ID advocates have applied Dembski's explanatory filter to
this phenomenon.7 3 That is, because there is a conjunction of
small probabilities and independent specificity, one has warrant
to infer that the emergence of human life is best explained by an
intelligent designer. However, as Meyer points out, other inter-
pretations, consistent with philosophical naturalism, have been
proposed as alternatives to the ID hypothesis: "(1) the so-called
for a Personal Transcendent God, in THE CREATION HYPOTHESIS (J.P. Moreland ed.,
1994).
68. Stephen C. Meyer, Evidence for Design in Physics and Biology: From the
Origin of the Universe to the Origin of Life, in 9 SCIENCE AND EVIDENCE FOR DESIGN
IN THE UNIVERSE 56-57 (Michael J. Behe et al., contribs., 2000) (note omitted).
69. Id. at 57.
70. Ross, Big Bang Refined By Fire, supra note 67, at 372.
71. Id. at 381.
72. Walter L. Bradley, Designed orDesignoid, in MERE CREATION, supra note
28, at 40 (quoting D.L. BROCK, OUR UNIVERSE: ACCIDENT OR DESIGN? (1992)).
73. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 68, at 56-66.
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weak anthropic principle, which denies that the fine tuning
needs explanation; (2) explanations based on natural law; and
(3) explanations based on chance [including the multiple-uni-
verses hypothesis]. ' 7  ID advocates have responded to these
alternatives.75
Thus, according to some design theorists, the fine-tuning of
the universe for the possibility of human life exhibits the charac-
teristics of specified complexity, and thus can be attributed to an
intelligent agent. For it is contingent (i.e., it is one of many pos-
sibilities), complex (i.e., it is a highly improbable arrangement of
independent variables), and specified (i.e., it is a cosmological
pattern a capable intelligence could have constructed if it
intended to make the universe conducive to the arising of
human life).
C. Other Concerns and Arguments
Both proponents and opponents of design theory have
raised non-legal concerns about ID and its use in the practice of
science, some of which may be raised by teachers, school board
members, school administrators, scientists, and/or legislators
who are assessing whether their schools ought to permit or
require the teaching of ID. Because of the detail required to
address these concerns adequately, and because of the modest
goal of this essay, I will briefly mention these concerns and refer
the reader to works that address them. Some of these concerns
include the problem of dysteleology, 6 the practical payoffs and/
or fruitfulness of design, 77 whether ID will be a "science stop-
per,"78 the "God of the gaps" objection,79 design theory's invok-
74. Id. at 58.
75. See, e.g., id. at 58-66; see also DEMBSKI, supra note 25, at 264-68; BERND-
OLAF KIPPERS, INFORMATION AND THE ORIGIN OF LIFE 59-69 (1990); JOHN LES-
LIE, UNIVERSES (1989); FRANCIS CRICK, LIFE ITSELF: ITS ORIGIN AND NATURE,
89-93 (1981); RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 133-51 (1979);Jay
Wesley Richards, Many Worlds Hypotheses: A Naturalistic Alternative to Design, 49
PERSP. ON SC. & CHRISTIAN BELIEF 218-27 (1997); Robert Kaita, Design in Physics
& Biology: Cosmological Principle & Cosmic Imperative?, in MERE CREATION: SCI-
ENCE, FAITH & INTELLIGENT DESIGN 384 (William Dembski ed., 1998); William
Lane Craig, Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design, 39 BRIT.
J. PHIL. SCi. 389 (1988);John Earman, The SAP Also Rises: A Critical Examination
of the Anthropic Principle, 24 Am. PHIL. Q. 307, 307-16 (1987); John Leslie,
Anthropic Principle, World Ensemble, Design, 19 AM. PHIL. Q. 141, 150 (1982).
76. See DEMBSKI, supra note 25, at 261-64.
77. See DEMBSKI, No FREE LUNCH, supra note 20, at 311-71; RATZSCH, supra
note 20, at 137-47; Bruce L. Gordon, Is Intelligent Design Science?, in SIGNS OF
INTELLIGENCE: UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENT DESIGN 193, 207-16 (William A
Dembski & James A. Kushiner eds., 2001); Moreland, supra note 27, at 62-64.
78. See DEMBSKI, supra note 25, at 150-52.
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ing of unobservables,8 ° its lack of appeal to natural law and
mechanism,81 and the testability of design theory,8 2 all of which
have been replied to by design advocates.83
The four areas which we covered in presenting the case for
design-specified complexity, irreducible complexity of biologi-
cal systems, the information content of DNA, and the fine-tuning
of the universe for life-are not the only areas in which or by
which design theorists have made their case." For example,
some design theorists have argued that the fossil record fits bet-
ter with a design hypothesis than with a Darwinian one. For Evo-
lutionists admit that the record does not reveal gradual
development from simple to more complex species, 85 as pre-
dicted by Darwin. Rather, in what is called the "Cambrian explo-
sion, 86 the record reveals the sudden appearance at differing
times of information-rich organisms within a hierarchical diver-
sity of species with apparently no precursors. Their body plans
with their improbable arrangement of parts, including the infor-
mation content of their DNA and the irreducible complexity of
their biological systems and sub-systems, exhibit the characteris-
tics of specified complexity. Hence, some design theorists
79. See supra note 29; see also DEMBSKI, supra note 25, at 238-45; RATZSCH,
supra note 20, at 143-47; Reynolds, supra note 29; Moreland, supra note 27, at
59-60.
80. See Moreland, supra note 27, at 60-62.
81. See DEMBSK1, No FREE LUNCH, supra note 20, at 325-33.
82. See id. at 355-65; Michael J. Behe, Answering Scientific Criticisms of Intel-
ligent Design, in SCIENCE AND EVIDENCE FOR DESIGN IN THE UNIVERSE 133, 144-47
(Wethersfield Inst. ed., 2000).
83. Although I do not directly address all of these concerns by name in
my book, FRANCIS BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2003),
most of them are addressed implicitly and/or in a cursory fashion in much of
what I cover concerning the arguments for ID (ch. 3, section B), the nature of
science (ch. 1, section B, pt. 4; ch. 3, section A), and the problems with method-
ological naturalism (ch. 3, section A).
84. See, e.g., DEBATING DESIGN: FROM DARWIN TO DNA, supra note 20; DAR-
WINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION supra note 20; CORNELIUS G. HUNTER,
DARWIN'S GOD: EVOLUTION AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL (2001); RATZSCH, supra
note 20; MERE CREATION: SCIENCE, FAITH & INTELLIGENT DESIGN (William Demb-
ski ed., 1998); THE CREATION HYPOTHESIS: SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE FOR AN INTELLI-
GENT DESIGNER (J.P. Moreland ed., 1994).
85. See, e.g., Stephen J. Gould & Niles Eldridge, Punctuated Equlibrium
Comes of Age, NATURE 223 (1993); Niles Eldridge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punc-
tuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism, in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY
82 (ThomasJ. M. Schopf ed., 1972).
86. The Cambrian explosion refers "to the geologically sudden appear-
ance of at least twenty animal body plans 530 million years ago." Stephen C.
Meyer et al., The Cambrian Explosion: Biology's Big Bang, in DARWINISM, DESIGN,
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 20.
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employ the facts of the Cambrian explosion in their arguments
for ID and against both Darwinism as well as its leading naturalis-
tic competitor, "punctuated equilibrium. "87
In sum, the ID project is significant because it challenges,
with serious and sophisticated arguments, the philosophical core
of evolutionary theory, which maintains that (1) all living beings
only give the appearance of being designed but in reality have
been engineered by the unintelligent forces of natural selection
(perhaps in combination with other natural, non-agent directed
processes, e.g., random change), and (2) that the entire natural
universe and all the natural entities in it can be accounted for by
strictly material processes without resorting to any designer, Cre-
ator, or non-material agent as an explanation for either any
aspect of the universe or the universe as a whole (that is, an
exhaustive materialist description of the natural universe is in
principle possible).
II. TEACHING ID IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In order to assess the question of whether requiring or per-
mitting the teaching of ID in public schools is constitutional, it is
essential that we answer two questions: (A) What is Religion?; (B)
Is ID a Religion?
A. What is Religion?
Throughout the history of our Republic courts have pro-
posed or implied different definitions of religion, broadening
their definitions as the country increased in religious diversity
and the judiciary began to face new types of cases. Since the
literature on "defining religion" constitutionally is vast,88 it is not
87. See, e.g., Stephen Jay Gould, Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary
Theory, in PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY (Michael Ruse ed., 1998). For a critical
examination of Gould's theory, see Meyer et al., supra note 86; MICHAEL RUSE,
THE DARWINIAN PARADIGM: ESSAYS ON ITS HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGIOUS
IMPLICATIONS 118-45 (1989).
88. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 869-905 (2002); THOMAS C. BERG, THE STATE AND RELIGION IN A NUTSHELL
(1998); ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
90-91 (1990); H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There Be Peaceful
Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State ?, 13 BYUJ. PUB. L. 203, 251-59 (1999);
Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv.
309 (1994); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establish-
ment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH L. REv. 266 (1987);
George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of
"Religion", 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Jesse H. Choper, Defining 'Religion' in the
First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579; Steven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welsh:
PUBLIC EDUCATION, RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT
possible to conduct a thorough study in this essay. For this rea-
son, I will focus on a few important cases and theoretical insights
that I believe will be helpful in assessing ID.
Although it is true that "the Supreme Court has been reluc-
tant to elaborate an authoritative definition of religion, it has
addressed the issue in a number of cases stretching back to the
nineteenth century."89 Religion was defined in early decisions
"as an organized body of believers employing religious ceremony
and having a faith in and commitment to a supernatural
Supreme Being."9 °  In an 1890 case, Davis v. Beason,91 the
Supreme Court first attempted to give content to the constitu-
tional meaning of religion: "The term 'religion' has reference to
one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations
they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obe-
dience to his will."
9 2
The modern trend in the courts toward a broader and more
global view of religion began in a Second Circuit court case.9"
The court denied an atheist status as a conscientious objector
because his refusal to serve in the military was based exclusively
on political grounds. However, in writing for the court, Judge
Redefining Religion Under the Constitution, 31 EMORY L.J. 973 (1982); William W.
Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separation of Church and State: The Quest for a Coherent
Position, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 865, 873-75 (1963); Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The
Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791 (1997); Richard 0. Frame, Note, Belief in a
Nonmaterial Reality-A Proposed First Amendment Definition of Religion, 1992 ILL. L.
REV. 819; Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056 (1978).
89. Pefialver, supra note 88, at 795. For a brief overview of the areas in
which the Supreme Court has addressed this issue, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKV,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 972-77 (1997). Chemerinsky
argues that the Court has dealt with the issue in three contexts: conscientious
objector exemption, whether a court may inquire into the sincerity of one's
beliefs, and whether sincere personal beliefs are protected even if they are
unconnected to an established dogma or group.
90. Joel Incorvaia, Teaching Transcendental Meditation in Public Schools:
Defining Religion for Establishment Purposes, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325, 336-37
(1979).
91. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
92. Id. at 342. Incorvaia points out that:
Davis involved the criminal prosecution of a member of the Mormon
religion under an Idaho statute disenfranchising persons from voting
or holding elected office if they belonged to any organization practic-
ing or advocating bigamy or polygamy. The Court upheld the statute's
constitutionality against a free exercise challenge. It refused to recog-
nize that a belief in bigamy or polygamy could be a tenet of a bona
fide religious faith, saying: "To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is
to offend the common sense of mankind."
Incorvaia, supra note 90, at 337 n.51 (quoting Davis, 133 U.S. at 341-42).
93. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
20031
484 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
Augustus Hand, in dictum, denied that belief in God was a neces-
sary condition of "religious training and belief' under the Con-
gressional statute in question.94 That is to say, he held that
conscientious objection prodded by conscience and grounded in
firmly held beliefs that are not conventionally religious could
nonetheless be considered "religious," even though Hand
believed "[I] t is unnecessary to attempt a definition of religion;
the content of the term is found in the history of the human race
and is incapable of compression into a few words."95
The courts continued to broaden their definition of relig-
ion, accepting as religious many belief-systems and practices that
may not initially strike one as religious. For instance, in Torcaso
v. WatkinP6 the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional
for the Commonwealth of Maryland to make belief in God a
requirement for becoming a notary public. The Court affirmed
that a belief-system can be religious without being theistic:
"[A]mong religions in this country which do not teach what
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God
are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and
others."9 7 In United States v. Seege?8 the Court ruled that a belief
is religious if it is a "sincere and meaningful belief which occu-
pies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by"
traditional belief in God.99
In Seeger the Court cited as an authority the work of theolo-
gian Paul Tillich °° who has argued that all human beings,
including atheists, have an ultimate commitment of one sort or
another, something that serves as a unifying center for their per-
sonality and consciousness. This ultimate concern is "relig-
ious."1" 1 It is evident, therefore, why the Court defined religion
as a sincere belief "based upon a power or being or upon a faith,
to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ulti-
94. Id. at 708.
95. Id.
96. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
97. Id. at 495 n.11 (1961).
98. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
99. Id. at 176.
100. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180, 187 (citing PAUL TILLICH, 2 SYSTEMATIC THE-
OLOGY 12 (1957); PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948)).
101. D. MACKENZIE BROWN, ULTIMATE CONCERN: TILLICH IN DLLOGUE 4-5
(1965). Similarly, philosopherJohn Dewey, who considered his own espousal of
humanism "religious," defined religion in the following way: "Any activity pur-
sued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of per-
sonal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in
quality." JOHN DEwEY, A COMMON FAITH 27 (1934).
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mately dependent."' 2 Perhaps the same sort of reasoning was
behind the Court's comments in School District of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 10 3 in which it asserted that "the State may not
establish a 'religion of secularism'... thus 'preferring those who
believe in no religion over those who do believe.'"104
This type of reasoning is sometimes called the parallel posi-
tion test (PPT), a type of definition by analogy:"0 5 does the dis-
puted belief function in the life of the individual in a way parallel
to the way in which conventional religion functions in the life of
the believer? This has been typically applied in Free Exercise
cases in which the designation of "religion" is a benefit (such as
in Torcaso and Seeger). The few Establishment Clause cases in
which plaintiffs have suggested that the PPT be applied to beliefs
that are not prima facie religious, the courts have largely ruled in
favor of defendants."0 6 An exception to this general rule is the
Malnak v. Yogi'0 7 case in the Third Circuit, which applied PPT in
upholding a district court ruling that held that the Science of
Creative Intelligence/Transcendental Meditation (SCI/TM) is
religion, and thus offering non-required classes in it in New
Jersey public schools violated the Establishment Clause. 08 But in
this case, the plaintiffs provided reams of evidence that made it
102. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
103. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
104. Id. at 225 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
For a provocative commentary and collection of documents on the subject of
humanism and religion, see DAVID A. NOEBEL ET AL., CLERGY IN THE CLASSROOM:
THE RELIGION OF SECULAR HUMANISM (2d ed. 2000).
105. For an explanation and illustration of the "parallel position test," see
Pefialver, supra note 88, at 799-800.
106. See, e.g., Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that the city of San Jose did not violate the Establishment Clause
when it installed a sculpture of Quetzalcoad, an Aztec god, because "while
[arguably underlying New Age concepts] invoke 'ultimate concerns,' [they] fail
to demonstrate any shared or comprehensive doctrine or to display any of the
structural characteristics or formal signs associated with traditional religions."
Id. at 1230 (following the three-part test used to define religion in Africa v.
Pennsylvania: "addresses fundamental and ultimate questions," "is comprehen-
sive in nature," and "often can be recognized by the presence of certain formal
and external signs." 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3rd Cir. 1982)); Peloza v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 782 F. Supp. 1412 (C.D. Cal. 1992) ("Peloza 1"), affd in part,
Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Peloza IT)
(maintaining that a public school does not violate the Establishment Clause if it
requires teachers to teach evolution, for it is not a "religious belief" because it is
not defined as such in the dictionary or in Establishment Clause case law, and it
does not explicitly deny the existence of a Creator).
107. 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
108. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977) ("Malnak r), affd
per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Malnak IF).
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clear and convincing to the court that SCI/TM is a religion. In
the other Ninth Circuit cases, in which the court rejected claims
of Establishment, these claims were rejected not because the
court did not apply PPT, but rather, because the court applied the
test and concluded that the policy in question did not advance a
religion.'0 9 Granted, it is fair to ask whether the courts' opinions
in those two cases-Peloza II and Alvarado--were well-reasoned
and/or rightly decided. It is clear, however, that courts apply the
same test in both Free Exercise and Establishment cases.
This is why commentators are mistaken when they claim that
there are two different definitions of religion, one for the Free
Exercise Clause and another for the Establishment Clause." 0 In
fact, "the Supreme Court never has accepted this position.""1 In
Everson Justice Wiley B. Rutledge unequivocally rejected the
notion of a dual definition of religion, "'Religion"' appears only
once in the Amendment. But the word governs two prohibitions
and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one nar-
row to forbid 'an establishment' and another, much broader, for
securing 'the free exercise thereof."12
In order to better understand how modern courts have
come to their conclusions about what constitutes a religion, let us
engage in a brief thought experiment by trying to answer the
philosophical question, "What is a religion?". This question has
been given many answers. For instance, some have said that a
religion is some sort of belief system that necessarily includes a
belief in a god and/or life after death. But, as the courts have
come to appreciate, one problem with this definition is that it
excludes beliefs, such as Taoism and Theravada Buddhism, that
109. For example, in Alvarado, if the city of San Jose had installed a sculp-
ture ofJesus of Nazareth rather than the Aztec god, Quetzalcoatl, the city might
have run afoul of the Establishment Clause, for belief in Jesus does address
ultimate questions, it is comprehensive in nature, and its presence is recognized
by certain external and formal signs. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989) (ruling that a nativity display on city property, not surrounded
by secular symbols, is unconstitutional because it sends the message that the
county promotes and supports Christianity).
110. See, for example, Laurence Tribe's comments in which he argues
that "all that is 'arguably religious' should be considered religious in a free exer-
cise analysis... ; anything 'arguably non-religious' should not be considered relig-
ious in applying the establishment clause." LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 828 (1st ed. 1978). Tribe, however, has since retreated
from this position, arguing that having two definitions of religion "presents a
number of problems, most importantly the first amendment's text." LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1186 (2d ed. 1988).
111. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 89, at 973.
112. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
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are generally thought of as religions but do not include a belief
in God or gods." 3 Other religions do not have a full fledged
belief in life after death, as in the cases of early Greek religion
and Unitarianism,114 though no one doubts that they are reli-
gions. There are other belief-systems, such as Humanism, whose
creeds put forth answers to most of the questions traditional reli-
gions try to answer."' This is why the Supreme Court has said
that forms of non-theism can be religion for both Free Exer-
cise' 16 and Establishment purposes. 1 7 Although no courts, to
my knowledge, have made this point, it is worth mentioning that
some philosophers have argued that belief in God may not even
be a sufficient condition for a belief to be religious if "God" is
employed as an explanatory postulate rather than worshiped as
an object of devotion." 8 Admittedly, in one federal district court
creation/evolution case, McLean v. Arkansas," 9 the judge rejects
this notion, 2 ° but it is certainly not because he tried and failed
to extend his philosophical imagination; he just did not even
try 121
113. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll ("Among reli-
gions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a
belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular
Humanism and others.").
114. ALAN GOMES, UNITARIANISM/UNIVERSALISM (1998).
115. Among these questions are the following. What is the nature of ulti-
mate reality? What is the nature of humanity? Are there moral norms that I
must follow and what are their source? How do I come to know these things
(i.e., revelation, natural reason, or both)? See, e.g., CURTIS W. REESE, HUMANIST
RELIGION (1931); CHARLES FRANCIS POTYER, HUMANISM: A NEw RELIGION
(1930); HUMANIST SERMONS (Curtis W. Reese ed., 1927); CURTIS W. REESE,
HUMANISM (1926).
116. See supra note 113; see also Seeger, 380 U.S. 176.
117. "[T] he State may not establish a 'religion of secularism'... thus pre-
ferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe." Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1952)).
118. For example, J.P. Moreland argues that the concept "God," for Aris-
totle and Isaac Newton, served the same function as "quark" and "continental
plate" serve in contemporary science: an explanatory entity and not an object of
worship. J.P. MORELAND, SCALING THE SECULAR CITY 209-11 (1987).
119. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
120. "The argument advanced by defendants' witness, Dr. Norman Gei-
sler, that teaching the existence of God is not religious unless the teaching
seeks a commitment, is contrary to common understanding and contradicts set-
tled case law." McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1266 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980); Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. 203 (1963)).
121. Professor Geisler's account of his own testimony reveals a much
more sophisticated argumentation than Judge Overton lets on. Geisler and his
co-authors write:
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In sum, one thing is clear about the courts and religion: they
have provided us with no clear definition of religion. Neverthe-
less, they have provided us with some general guidelines which
we can extract from the above analysis:
Conventional religions-e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Bud-
dhism-are paradigm cases of religion.
Whether other belief systems are religious ought to be eval-
uated by the parallel position test (PPT): does the disputed
belief function in the life of the individual in a way parallel
to the way in which conventional religion functions in the
life of the believer?
The parallel position test is applied in both Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause cases.
If we combine these guidelines with the standard for teach-
ing origins set down in Edwards, we are prepared to answer the
question of whether ID is religion.
B. Is iD a Religion?
We will first apply the above guidelines to ID, then we will
apply the standard put forth by the Supreme Court in Edwards,
and conclude with one final objection to the teaching of ID in
public schools.
1. Applying the General Guidelines
a. Is IL a Conventional Religion?
ID is not a conventional religion and thus is not a paradigm
case of a religion. Rather, it is a point of view based on philo-
sophical and empirical arguments. The purpose of ID is to pro-
vide answers to the same questions for which the evolutionary
paradigm is said to provide answers. That is, design theory and
evolution are two contrary perspectives about the same subject.
Admittedly, if the ID arguments are plausible, they do lend sup-
port to the metaphysical claims of some conventional religions
such as Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. However, as Justice
Geisler said that you cannot reject the Creator just because He is an
object of religious worship for some. He illustrated this in two ways:
(1) Jesus is an object of religious worship. It is historically verifiable
that He lived. Do we reject His historicity just because He is an object
of religious worship? (2) Some people have made rocks the object of
their religious worship. Do we reject the existence of rocks because
they are an object of religious worship? Then he said you cannot reject
a creator just because some have made him the object of religious
worship.
NORMAN L. GEISLER ET AL., CREATOR IN THE COURTROOM: SCOPES II 116 (1982).
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Powell wrote in his Edwards concurrence, "a decision respecting
the subject matter to be taught in public schools does not violate
the Establishment Clause simply because the material to be
taught 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of
some or all religions.'"122 Dembski claims that the inference to a
disembodied intelligence that can account for specified com-
plexity in nature "is compatible with" an array of metaphysical
points of view such as "pantheism, panentheism, Stoicism, Neo-
platonism, deism, and theism. It is incompatible with natural-
ism. ' 123 Consequently, if a point of view is religious because its
plausibility lends support to a religion or a religious point of
view, then we would have to conclude that evolution is as much a
religion as ID, for, as we have seen, it lends support to some
nontheistic and anti-religious perspectives recognized as reli-
gions by the Court.1 4 Perhaps this is why atheist and skeptic
groups are the most vociferous opponents of ID, for they see ID
as a possible defeater to evolution, a viewpoint whose truth is
essential to the veracity of their worldview, philosophical
naturalism. 
12 5
Thus, forbidding the teaching of ID (or legitimate criticisms
of evolution) in public schools because it lends support to a relig-
ion, while exclusively permitting or requiring the teaching of
evolution, might be construed by a court as viewpoint discrimina-
tion,' 2 6 a violation of state neutrality on matters of relig-
122. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 605 (1987) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980); McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
123. No FREE LUNCH, supra note 20, at 334.
124. "[T]he State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' ... thus
'preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe."' Sch.
Dist., 374 U.S. at 225 (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). In Torcaso v.
Watkins, the Court writes: "Among religions in this country which do not teach
what would generally be considered a belief in God are Buddhism, Taoism,
Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others." 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11
(1961).
125. See, for example, the essays on The Secular Web, at http://infidels.
org/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2003) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy); Atheism Awareness, at http://atheismawareness.home.
att.net/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2003) (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy); and the special ID issue of 8.4 SKE-ric (2000).
126. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (ruling
that it was a denial of students' free speech rights, as well as a risk of nurturing
hostility toward religion, to prohibit the students from using student-funds for a
religiously-oriented publication); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (ruling that it does not violate the establishment
clause for a public school district to permit a church to show, after school hours
and on school property, a religiously-oriented film on family life); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (finding that a religious student group's free
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ion,117and/or the institutionalizing of a metaphysical
orthodoxy, 2 8 for ID and evolution are not two different subjects
(the first religion, the second science) but two different answers
about the same subject.
Jay Wexler disagrees with this analysis. He asserts that
"evolution in pure form addresses only the question of how living
creatures change over time."' 2 9 "It does not address the question
of origins nor does it postulate the meaning of life. It deals only
with proximate causes, not ultimate ones."' 3 ° Thus, evolution
and design are not two answers to the same question, but two
different subjects. Ironically, in defense of these assertions Wex-
ler cites several works including ones by Monroe Strickberger 13 1
and DouglasJ. Futuyama.132 But Wexler takes these citations out
of context. For both authors in fact claim that evolution and
design are different and incompatible answers to the same sub-
ject and that ID is mistaken. Consider first the following claims
made by Strickberger in the same text cited by Wexler:
The presently accepted view ... suggests that at a distant
time in the past the whole universe was a small sphere of
concentrated energy/matter. This substance then
exploded in a big bang to form hydrogen first and then
eventually all the galaxies and stars.' 3
3
speech and association rights were violated when it was prohibited by a state
university from meeting on campus).
127. According to the Court,
[the g]overnment ... must be neutral in matters of religious theory,
doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the
advocacy of nonreligion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one
religion or religious theory against another or even against the mili-
tant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutral-
ity between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). In the footnote following
this quote, the Court cites a series of prior cases that are well known for their
call for government neutrality on matters of religion: Torcaso, 367 U.S. 488;
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Zorach, 343 U.S. 67; McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Arkansas, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
128. The Court writes in Epperson: "[T] his Court said in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents [385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)], the First Amendment 'does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."' 93 U.S. at 105.
129. Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV.
439, 462 n.212 (1997).
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing MONROE W. STRICKBERGER, EVOLUTION 598 (1996)).
132. Id. at 469 n.268 (citing DOUGLAS J. FUTUYAMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL:
THE CASE FOR EVOLUTION 10-14 (1983)).
133. STRICKBERGER, supra note 131, at 71.
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The variability on which selection depends may be ran-
dom, but adaptions are not; they arise because selection
chooses and perfects only what is adaptive. In this scheme
a God of design and purpose is not necessary.'
3 4
The following are claims made by Futuyama in the book cited by
Wexler:
The implications [in arguing that life came from inorganic
matter] are so daunting that Darwin himself was reluctant
to commit his beliefs to paper. In The Origin of Species he
limited himself to saying that "probably all organic beings
which have ever lived on earth, have descended from one
primordial form, into which life was first breathed"-a
phrase which is certainly open to theological
interpretation.' 3
5
We will almost certainly never have direct fossil evidence
that living molecular structures evolved from nonliving
precursors. Such molecules surely could not have been
preserved without degradation. But a combination of geo-
chemical evidence and laboratory experiment shows that such
evolution is not only plausible but almost undeniable.'3 6
By providing materialistic, mechanistic explanations,
instead of miraculous ones, for the characteristics of plants
and animals, Darwin brought biology out of the realm of
theology and into the realm of science. For miraculous
spiritual forces fall outside the province of science; all of
science is the study of material causation.'
3 7
[O]rder in nature is no evidence of design.' 3 8
Wexler is mistaken, for evolution in fact provides an answer
to the very same question ID provides an answer: What is the ori-
gin of apparent design in biological organisms and/or other
aspects of the natural universe? Evolution answers the question
by appealing to the forces of unguided matter, the latter to intel-
ligent agency. Same question, different answers.
Wexler makes another point that's worth addressing, since it
has been employed in a few court cases: 13 9 "[B] elief in evolution
134. Id. at 67.
135. FUTUYAMA, supra note 132, at 95 (quoting DARWIN, supra note 48, at
484).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
139. In McLean, for example, the court writes: "The idea that belief in a
creator and acceptance of the scientific theory of evolution are mutually exclu-
sive is a false premise and offensive to the religious views of many .... Dr.
Francisco Ayala, a geneticist of considerable renown and a former Catholic
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and belief in religion are not mutually exclusive, as evidenced by
the many generations of devout religious believers who have also
believed in evolution." 4 This is hardly persuasive, for at least
two reasons.
(a) The fact that people claim that beliefs they hold are con-
sistent with one another is not the same as providing an argu-
ment that they are in fact consistent. By appealing to people's
subjective perceptions of their own beliefs rather than to the con-
tent of the beliefs themselves, Wexler commits a category mis-
take. For internal consistency is a property had by systems of
belief that contain numerous propositional claims. Those claims
and not those who believe those claims are the appropriate objects
of analysis. After all, if Wexler were a criminal defense attorney
confronted with an apparently friendly witness who testified in
deposition that Wexler's client was not at the scene of the crime
but at trial testified that the defendant was at the scene of the
crime, Wexler would not get very far with the jury by claiming
that the witness's inconsistent testimonies are in fact consistent
because she believes they are consistent.
(b) If Wexler is talking about design theory and evolution,
they are, as we have seen, not compatible beliefs but two answers
to the same question. This is what one continually finds in the
literature published by leading evolutionists.14 I For if all that is
meant by evolution is that biological species adapt over time to
changing environments and pass on those adaptations geneti-
cally to their offspring, not even most creationists would disagree
with that modest definition of evolution. Thus, what Wexler pro-
poses as a definition of evolution is vague enough to refer to
either microevolution, macroevolution, or both. But that is not
what many citizens find objectionable about evolution, and it is
not what is actually defended by proponents of evolutionary the-
ory. What these citizens find objectionable, and what is actually
priest who has the equivalent of a Ph.D. in theology, pointed out that many
working scientists who subscribed to the theory of evolution are devoutly relig-
ious." 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 n.23 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Also, in Peloza II, the
court asserts that evolution "has nothing to do with whether or not there is a
divine Creator (who did or did not create the universe or did or did not plan
evolution as part of a divine scheme)." 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994).
140. Wexler, supra note 129, at 462 n.212.
141. See, e.g., STRICKBERGER, supra note 131; ANTHONY FLEW, DARWINIAN
EVOLUTION 1-72 (1997); JAMES RACHELS, Created from Animals: The Moral
Implications of Darwinism 110 (1990); MICHAEL RUSE, THE DARWINIAN PARA-
DIGM: ESSAYS ON ITS HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS (1989);
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 5-6 (1986); FUTUYAMA, supra note
132; GEORGE GAYLORD SIMPSON, THE MEANING OF EVOLUTION: A STUDY OF THE
HISTORY OF LIFE AND OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR MAN 279 (1967).
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affirmed in the literature, is the methodological naturalism that
evolution presupposes and the ontological materialism it entails.
Granted, belief in the existence of God is not logically inconsistent
with materialism, but the existence of God-if God is defined as
the immaterial self-existent Creator of all that contingently
exists-is inconsistent with materialism, the view that the natural
universe is all that exists and all the entities in it can be
accounted for by strictly material processes without resorting to
any designer, Creator or non-material entity as an explanation
for either any aspect of the natural universe or the universe as a
whole. Given the fact that materialist explanations, according to
the naturalists who dominate the academy, are the only ones
accorded the privilege of being called "knowledge" (the others
are pejoratively called "supernatural" or "miraculous" and are
never permitted to count against materialist explanations), to say
that belief in God's existence is not inconsistent with evolution is
to imply that God is not really an object of knowledge. For if it
were, the existence of a God (and/or any other non-material
reality, e.g., mind, moral properties, numbers), if one had good
reasons to believe in it, would be allowed to count against meth-
odological naturalism and ontological materialism and not pro-
voke the ridicule and derision142 and/or the intellectual
segregation suggested by the newest "friends" of God who never-
theless do not believe in him.'43 The question then is whether
non-materialist claims to knowledge really can be knowledge. If
they can not, then ID and evolution are consistent, since the first
is a belief (in the popular sense of unproven opinion) and the
latter is knowledge. However, if they both can be claims of
142. See, for example, Phillip Kitcher's particularly condescending assess-
ment of ID. Phillip Kitcher, Born-Again Creationism, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CRE-
ATIONISM, supra note 3, at 257.
143. For example, Stephen Jay Gould suggests what he calls the NOMA
principle, "non-overlapping magisterial."
Each subject [science and religion] has a legitimate magesterium, or
domain of teaching authority-and these magesteria do not overlap
.... The net of science covers the empirical universe; what it is made
of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The net of religion
extends over questions of moral meaning and value.
Stephen Jay Gould, Nonoverlapping Magisteria, 106 NATURAL HISTORY 16 (Mar.
1997). But to what magisterium does NOMA belong? It seems to be a philo-
sophical principle by which Gould assesses the nature of science and religion,
and thus Gould is implying that philosophy is logically prior to science and thus the
appropriate discipline by which to assess questions of the nature of science. If
that's what he is implying, then it is not clear on what grounds he could object
to or not seriously consider ID arguments against methodological naturalism,
for they are typically philosophical challenges to the prevailing view of the
nature of science.
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knowledge-that is, contrary answers to the same question-
then they are inconsistent claims. Thus, Wexler can coherently
claim that the existence of God (if this is what Wexler means by
"belief in religion") ,144 a non-material reality, is consistent with
the truth of evolution only if (1) he defines evolution in such a
modest fashion that it is unobjectionable to even hard-line crea-
tionists or (2) he takes evolution to entail materialist metaphysics
and defines belief in God in such a subjective fashion that God is
not a proper object of knowledge.
b. Applying the Parallel Position Test to JD
Because ID is not a conventional religion, could someone
challenge the teaching of it in public schools on establishment
grounds145 and legitimately argue that it is a "religion" on the
basis of the parallel position test (PPT)?: Does ID function in the
life of its proponents in a way parallel to the way in which con-
ventional religion functions in the life of the believer? In order
to assess whether a purported belief is constitutionally a religion,
the Ninth Circuit developed a tripartite application of PPT,
which it extracted from prior opinions in the Third Circuit: 146
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate ques-
tions having to do with deep and imponderable matters.
Second, a religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of
a belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third, a
religion often can be recognized by the presence of certain
formal and external signs. 14 7
(i) ID does not "address fundamental and ultimate ques-
tions having to do with deep and imponderable matters."148
Rather, it addresses the same question raised by Darwinists: What
144. "Belief in religion" is so vague it may include everything from Unita-
rian/Universalism (some branches of which are indistinguishable from full-
blooded atheistic materialism) to Animism. Since Wexler does not define pre-
cisely what he means by "belief in religion" I will take it to mean something that
includes belief in the existence of an immaterial ultimate reality, God, which
may be a pantheistic, monotheistic, Platonic, Aristotelean, or panentheistic
God, a being whose existence would be a defeater to materialism as a
worldview.
145. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 129.
146. See Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 520 (9th Cir.
1994); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981) (prisoner
denied Free Exercise benefits on the grounds that the group affiliation to
which he appealed, MOVE, was not a religion); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,
200-15 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
147. Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032).
148. Id.
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is the origin of apparent design in biological organisms and/or
other aspects of the natural universe? Of course, as I pointed out
above, design theory lends plausibility and support to theism, but
that is not enough for it to meet this test. For evolution lends
plausibility and support to some nontheisms and thus addresses
the same questions as ID but provides different answers. In other
words, if one claims that ID meets this test, then one must claim
that evolution does as well. In addition, to cite Justice Powell yet
again, a public school curriculum "does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause simply because the material to be taught 'happens
to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all reli-
gions.""" Federal court interference with the policy decisions
of local and state educational authorities is warranted "only when
the purpose for their decisions is clearly religious."'5 °
(ii) ID is not "comprehensive in nature" and it is not a
"belief-system." '151 Rather it is an example of "an isolated teach-
ing,' 152 something that is consistent with certain religious belief-
systems but is itself not a "religion," for one can logically hold to
ID without accepting the comprehensive belief system of any
conventional religion. In this sense ID is similar to a moral
claim. For example, believing that human beings have intrinsic
dignity by nature (a moral claim) is a rationally defensible belief
that is consistent with many religious belief-systems even though
one may logically hold to the position while denying the truth of
every religious belief-system.
Moreover, design theorists do not defend their position by
appealing to esoteric knowledge, special revelation, or religious
authority. They make philosophical and scientific arguments
whose merits should be assessed by their soundness rather than
because their conclusions are inconsistent with philosophical
naturalism.
(iii) ID does not have the "presence of certain formal and
external signs" such as "formal services, ceremonial functions,
the existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at
propagation, observance of holidays and other similar manifesta-
tions associated with traditional religions. ' 15' Although ID pro-
149. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 605 (1987) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980); McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
150. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 605 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
151. Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032).
152. Id. (quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032).
153. Id. (quoting Africa 662 F.2d at 1032, 1035-36) (internal quotations
omitted).
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ponents "have formed organizations and institutes, . . . these
resemble other academic or professional associations rather than
churches or religious institutions."'
5 4
Thus, according to the general guidelines laid down by the
courts, ID is not a religion, and thus to teach it in public schools
would not violate the Establishment Clause.
2. The Edwards Standard
Suppose someone agrees that according to the above guide-
lines ID is not a religion, but contends that those guidelines are
not the appropriate standard by which to evaluate ID. Rather,
the proper test is found in Edwards, the case that set the standard
by which public school curricula on origins should be evaluated.
The statute assessed in Edwards was struck down for four rea-
sons: (1) its historical continuity with Scopes, (2) its textual con-
nection to the Genesis-inspired statutes struck down in Epperson
and McLean, (3) the religious motivation of its supporters, and
(4) its illegitimate means (i.e., advancing religion, limiting what
teachers may teach) to achieve appropriate state ends (i.e., aca-
demic freedom), though the Court concluded that the statute's
purported purpose (or end) was "a sham,"'155 and thus the statute
had no real secular purpose. Thus, the Court concluded that the
Louisiana statute advanced religion and thus violated the first
prong of the Lemon test.
1 56
154. DeWolf et al., supra note 21, at 86-87.
155. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587.
156. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court provided a three-part test
which is used by many courts to determine whether or not a given public policy
or law runs afoul of the establishment clause. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court
believed that this test is based on the history of the Court's decisions on the
matter of Church and State. Thus, if a challenged policy or law passes this test,
it is constitutional. However, it need only fail one prong of the test in order to
be declared unconstitutional:
Every analysis in this area [church/state cases] must begin with consid-
eration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the stat-
ute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion."
Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
It should be noted that some scholars as well as some post-Lemon opinions
by Supreme CourtJustices have criticized and questioned certain aspects of the
Lemon Test. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Lemon test is "a consti-
tutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to
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a. Reasons 1 and 2
Concerning reasons (1) and (2), ID is neither historically
connected to Scopes nor is its literature replete, as is creationist
literature, with "science" and recommended curricula that are
transparently derived directly from the Book of Genesis. ID's
intellectual pedigree is of a different order than the creation-sci-
ence the Court repudiated in Edwards. Although most design
theorists are theists, there is a wide range of opinion within the
ID camp.
157
Wexler argues that because ID has some historical connec-
tion to the creation/evolution controversy, it would not pass the
Edwards standard.5 8  But that seems patently unreasonable. It
would make the genetic fallacy' 5 9 a principle of constitutional
interpret, it is difficult to apply, and yields unprincipled results"); Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting an
"endorsement test."); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding "the
Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each legislative session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State," but not applying the Lemon test); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding Minnesota's policy that allowed taxpay-
ers to deduct from gross income actual expenses incurred for textbooks, tui-
tion, and transportation for dependents attending elementary and secondary
schools whether public or nonpublic, maintaining that Lemon is settled law but
is "no more than a signpost"); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 374 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding a fourth prong to the Lemon Test: "four
years ago, the Court, albeit without express recognition of the fact, added a
significant fourth factor to the test: 'A broader base of entanglement of yet a
different character is presented by the divisive political potential of these state
programs.'"); STEVEN V. MONSMA, POSITIVE NEUTRALITY: LETrING RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM RING (1993); ROBERT CORD, THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 169-211 (1982); Carl H. Esbeck, Equal
Treatment: Its Constitutional Status, in EQUAL TREATMENT IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
(Stephen V. Monsma &J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader Interpretation of Free Exer-
cise of Religion?, 15 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181 (1992); Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 685 (1992).
157. H. Wayne House, for instance, points out that "various contributors
to the seminal volume, Mere Creation, represent diverse theological beliefs, e.g.,
John Mark Reynolds (Eastern Orthodox), Jonathan Wells (the Unification
Church), David Berlinski (Judaism), and Michael Behe (Roman Catholic)." H.
Wayne House, Darwinism and the Law: Can Non-Naturalistic Scientific Theories Sur-
vive Constitutional Challenge?, 13 REGENT U. L. REv. 355, 403 (2000-2001).
158. Wexler, supra note 129, at 465.
159. The genetic fallacy occurs when the origin of a viewpoint or argu-
ment, rather than its merits, is employed to dismiss it out of hand. Although the
origin of an idea may play a part in assessing its merits, the genetic fallacy is
committed when the idea is dismissed based on its origin even though the ori-
gin of the idea is not a necessary condition for the soundness of the arguments
for it.
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jurisprudence. It is hard to imagine why anyone would find that
acceptable. After all, if an historical connection of any sort, no
matter how distant or loose, is sufficient to prohibit the teaching
of a subject, then perhaps astronomy and chemistry ought to be
prohibited from public school classrooms since they have their
historical origin in the religiously-oriented practices of astrology
and alchemy.
The Court's historical problem with the Creationism curric-
ulum required in the statute struck down in Edwards was its trans-
parent connection to the Book of Genesis and the contents of
previously repudiated statutes in Epperson and McLean. The
courts in these cases were asking the question: How closely does
the curricular content required by the statute parallel the crea-
tion story in Genesis, and/or is the curricular content prohibited
by the statute proscribed because it is inconsistent with the crea-
tion story in Genesis? Therefore, if there are no essential differ-
ences between ID and Creationism, the teaching of ID in public
schools, whether permitted or required by the state or voluntarily
imparted by an ambitious teacher, would not pass constitutional
muster. ID can be summarized in the following way:
(A) If an apparently designed entity exhibits specified
complexity (SC), one is warranted in inferring that the
entity is the result of an intelligent agent.
160
(B) SC can be reliably detected by an explanatory filter.
(C) The information content of DNA, the fine-tuning of
the universe for the existence of life, and the irreducible
complexity of some biological systems are instances of
specified complexity.
(D) Presupposing methodological naturalism and relying
exclusively on the resources of ontological materialism
(i.e., chance and necessity) cannot account for SC in the
instances listed in (C).
(E) One cannot exclude ID from serious consideration
because it is inconsistent with an a priori commitment to
MN and OM.
(F) Therefore, given (A) through (E), ID best accounts
for the irreducible complexity of some biological systems,
the information content of DNA, and the fine-tuning of
the universe for life.
160. However, as Dembski points out, an entity may be "designed" by an
agent in order for the entity to appear not to be designed. Hence, an entity may
be designed, but if it does not exhibit specified complexity-that is, its maker
has adequately made it undetectable-one is not warranted in inferring that it
is designed unless one has other evidence. No FREE LUNCH, supra note 20, at
23-24.
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(G) MN and OM have been challenged in other signifi-
cant ways including their apparent inability to provide the
epistemological and metaphysical resources to account for
immaterial entities that it seems rational to believe exist,
e.g., human beings are unified substances, the universe has
a first cause, moral properties, and rationality itself.
(H) Therefore, given (F) and (G), we have good reason to
reject both the epistemological presupposition of evolu-
tion (methodological naturalism) as well as its entailment
(ontological materialism).
No doubt ID has implications for the veracity of evolution: if
its arguments work, then ID is a defeater to evolution. But such
arguments propose conclusions whose premises do not contain
the Book of Genesis and its tenets as explicit or implicit proposi-
tions. These premises and their propositions, unlike the ones of
Creationism, are not derived from, nor are they grounded in, any
particular religion's interpretation of its special revelation. They
are, rather, the result of empirical facts (e.g., the information
content of DNA, the structure of the cell), well-grounded con-
ceptual notions (e.g., SC, IC), and critical reflection. These sub-
sequently serve as the basis from which one may infer that an
intelligent agent is likely responsible for the existence of certain
apparently natural phenomena. Granted, the conclusions
inferred by these premises may be consistent with, and lend sup-
port to, a tenet or tenets of a particular belief system. But that, in
itself, would not make ID ipso facto Creationism or even constitu-
tionally suspect. After all, the Big Bang theory, the most widely
accepted theory of the universe's origin, is more consistent with,
and lends support to, theism in comparison to other metaphysi-
cal rivals such as atheism. 16 1 Yet, no one is suggesting that the
Big Bang theory ought not to be taught in public schools because
it has metaphysical implications friendly to theism and may serve
as an impetus for some students to abandon naturalism as a
worldview.' 6 9 Therefore, if ID is to be declared unconstitutional,
it cannot be on the grounds that it is the Creationism repudiated
by the courts. 1
63
161. See, e.g., CRAIG & SMITH, supra note 20.
162. See David K. DeWolf, Academic Freedom After Edwards, 13 REGENT U. L.
REv. 447, 480-81 (2000-2001).
163. In a 1997 case a district court committed an unfortunate gaffe that
seems to some to define ID as synonymous with Creationism (sometimes called
"Creation Science"): "Creation Science, as the term shall be used herein, is the
theory that the universe, including all forms of life, was created literally in the
manner described in the Bible by a higher Being, or, as alternately described,
the theory of intelligent design or creation by a Divine Creator." Freiler v.
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b. Reasons 3 and 4
If an ID statute is to pass constitutional muster, it will be
judicially assessed in light of reasons (3) and (4), as well as rea-
sons (1) and (2), of the Edwards standard. Because, as of the
completion of this essay, no ID law has been challenged in court,
(3) and (4) will be analyzed with a bit of speculation and cri-
tique. We will cover two general areas: (i) secular reasons, and
(ii) religious motivation and the statute's means-end
relationship.
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Ed., 975 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. La. 1997). Although
this statement lacks clarity and rigor, it nevertheless has been employed by a
number of ID opponents to dismiss ID as nothing more than "Creation Sci-
ence." For example, the National Center for Science Foundation (NCSF) writes
that Freiler "is also noteworthy for recognizing that curriculum proposals for
'intelligent design' are equivalent to proposals for teaching creation science." It
went on to say that "the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling."
Niles Eldrige, Seven Significant Court Decisions on the Issue of Evolution and the Fail-
ure of Creationism, in THE TRIUMPH OF EVOLUTION AND THE FAILURE OF CREATION-
ISM 182 (2000). There are several problems with this argument. First, although
it is true that the Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court, it does
not follow that it affirmed the appropriateness of the lower court's use of the
term "Intelligent Design," since Creation Science has a definitive meaning in
the federal court cases that addressed the teaching of it in public schools. Sec-
ond, at best the district court is saying that Creation Science is sometimes called
Intelligent Design. It does not follow from this, however, that every claim of
affirming Intelligent Design is ipso facto a claim of affirming Creation Science.
For example, what if the state of Louisiana, by statute, were to rename Evolu-
tion "Intelligent Design" and require all its teachers and textbooks to do like-
wise? Would it now mean that Evolution (at least in Louisiana) is the same as
Creation Science and that "Intelligent Design" (alias "Evolution") must be
banned from classrooms, since, after all, the district court said that ID is the
same as Creation Science (at least according to the NCSE)? This is, of course,
silly. For one must examine the content of the view defended, e.g., Michael
Behe's argument for irreducible complexity, rather than dismissing it by seman-
tic fiat not held in appeal. Because we already know the meaning of Creation
Science from prior federal court cases, therefore, when the district court says
Creation Science may "be alternately described [as] the theory of intelligent
design," Freiler, 975 F. Supp. at 821, it is simply informing us of what should be
obvious to any rational mind committed to legal principle: renaming curricu-
lum that has already been repudiated in prior court cases does not now make
the unconstitutional curriculum constitutional (as if renaming slavery "employ-
ment" bypasses the requirements of the 13th Amendment). But since this truth
is based on legal principle, the inverse follows inexorably: renaming Intelligent
Design "Creation Science," as the NCSE has tried to do in its misuse of a quote
from the district court case, does not make ID unconstitutional (as if renaming
employment "slavery" requires that the Attorney General prosecute employers
for violating the 13th Amendment).
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i. Secular Reasons
Any government body that seeks to require or permit ID to
be taught in its public schools would have to justify it by appeal-
ing to secular reasons. Although having a religious motivation or
reason would not invalidate the statute, the absence of a secular
reason would.' 6 4 The following are four possible secular reasons
such a body could employ.
(A) The Endorsement Test
It could offer an endorsement test justification of the stat-
ute. In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor proposed an
"endorsement test" as an alternative to the Lemon Test, and some
recent opinions seem to have either explicitly or implicitly
embraced it as well.165 According to this test, if a government
action creates a perception that it is either endorsing or disfavoring
164. The Edwards Court rejected the Louisiana Act, not because it had a
religious purpose, but because it was entirely devoid of a secular one. In
Edwards, Justice Powell concedes that even if the Louisiana Balanced-Treatment
Act has a religious purpose, that "alone is not enough to invalidate" it. "The
religious purpose must predominate." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599
(1987) (Powell, J., concurring). The Court in Lemon asserts that "the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose," Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612
(1971) (emphasis added) (implying that it may have a religious purpose as
well).
165. 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639 (2002) (a school voucher program in Cleveland that gives vouchers directly
to students, who may then choose to use the funds to attend a private school
including a religious one, does not offend the establishment clause); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (direct funding to private schools including relig-
ious schools does not violate establishment clause, since the distribution is even-
handed and the use of the money to indoctrinate in religious schools cannot
reasonably be attributed to government and there is no evidence that funds
given to religious schools were used to indoctrinate); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (it was a denial of students' free
speech rights, as well as a risk of nurturing hostility toward religion to prohibit
the students from using student funds for a religiously-oriented publication);
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (it was con-
tent-based discrimination for the government to prohibit a controversial organ-
ization from sponsoring a religious display in a public park); Zobrest v.
Catalina, 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (a school district may not refuse to supply a sign-
language interpreter to a student at a religious high school when such govern-
ment benefits are neutrally dispensed to students without regard to the public-
nonpublic or sectarian-nonsectarian nature of the school); Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (it does not violate
the establishment clause for a public school district to permit a church to show,
after school hours and on school property, a religiously-oriented film on family
life); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (a religious student group's free
speech and association rights were violated when it was prohibited by a state
university from meeting on campus).
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a religion, the action is unconstitutional. The concern of this
test is whether the disputed activity suggests "a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political commu-
nity. '  (O'Connor, however, has presented differing defini-
tions of what counts as a nonadherent.)1 67
Although each of the cases cited in note 165 does not involve
public school curricula, but rather, the providing of public funds
to, and/or the use of public facilities and forums by, individuals
and/or institutions which propagate religious-oriented speech, it
would take little imagination to extend the principle that
grounds the endorsement test and apply it to curricula as well.
That is, if a particular curriculum gives the impression that a cer-
tain disputed, irreligious, point of view is favored-in this case,
evolution and ontological materialism-the state can argue that
in order to erase that perception, a statute requiring or permit-
ting the teaching of ID is necessary.
(B) The Neutrality Test
In order to accommodate jurists who reject the endorse-
ment test and believe that the state should be "neutral" when it
comes to religion and irreligion, an ID statute and its proponents
could appeal to basic fairness, relying on the Court's continuing
emphasis on state neutrality concerning religion and irreligion,
as well as the Court's opinions on the importance of parents'
control over their children's education.
The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions going back to
Everson,6 ' has held that the government should remain neutral
between religions and between religion and irreligion. The
Court in Epperson writes that
166. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
167. In Lynch, Justice O'Connor suggests that nonadherents are "ordinary
citizens," actual flesh and blood human beings, who are the recipients of the
government's messsage. Id. In a subsequent case, she proposes a type of "rea-
sonable person standard," suggesting that the nonadherent is an objective
observer fully informed of all the facts: "The relevant issue is whether an objec-
tive observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation
of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public
schools." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Thus, a law may pass or fail the endorsement test depending on who (or what)
counts as a nonadherent.
168. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67 (1953); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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[the] government . . . must be neutral in matters of relig-
ious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to
any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and it may
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory
against another or even against the militant opposite. The
First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion. 1
69
Thus, an ID statute could be justified on the basis of neutrality by
arguing that to teach only one theory of origins (evolution)-
that presupposes a controversial epistemology (methodological
naturalism), entails a controversial metaphysics (ontological
materialism), and is antithetical to traditional religious belief-
the state is in fact advocating, aiding, fostering, and promoting
irreligion, which it is constitutionally forbidden from doing. The
state is not merely teaching what some religious people find antag-
onistic or offensive to their faith, which would not be unconstitu-
tional.' 7 Rather, it is promoting a point of view-a metaphysical
perspective-that "occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by" traditional belief in God.' 7 '
Perhaps this is why Justice Black, in his Epperson concur-
rence, raised the question: "If the theory [of evolution] is consid-
ered anti-religious, as the Court indicates, how can the State be
bound by the Federal Constitution to permit its teachers to advo-
cate such an 'anti-religious' doctrine to schoolchildren?"' 7 2
According to Justice Black, "this issue presents problems under
the Establishment Clause far more troublesome than are dis-
cussed in the Court's opinion,"1 7 for "[t]he very cases cited by
the Court as supporting its conclusion that the State must be
neutral" assert that the State should not favor "one religious or
anti-religious view over another." '17 4 As Michael McConnell
points out:
In the marketplace of ideas, secular viewpoints and ideolo-
gies are in competition with religious viewpoints and ideol-
169. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
170. The Court has argued that the Constitution "forbids alike the prefer-
ence of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of a theory which is deemed
antagonistic to a particular dogma." Id. at 106-07. The Court has also said that
"the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views
distasteful to them...." Id. (quotingJohn Burstyn, Inc v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
505 (1952)).
171. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
172. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 113 (Black, J., concurring).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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ogies. It is no more neutral to favor the secular over the
religious than it is to favor the religious over the secular. It
is time for a reorientation of constitutional law: away from
the false neutrality of the secular state, toward a genuine
equality of rights.175
According to the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, "[a] t
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State."'1 76 Thus, when government schools, whose attend-
ance is generally compulsory, delve into matters epistemological
and metaphysical-matters that touch on the scope of human
knowledge, the ultimate nature of things, and who and what we
are-and imply or affirm an "orthodox" position on such mat-
ters,177 they define the attributes of personhood in a particular
sectarian way, and consequently, violate what the Court main-
tains is a fundamental liberty.
In this regard, one may employ Justice Kennedy's coercion
test, which he applied in Lee v. Weisman, a case in which the
Court ruled unconstitutional a public middle school's invitation
to a local clergyman to perform an invocation and benediction at
its graduation ceremony. 178 According to Justice Kennedy,
"[t] he Establishment Clause was inspired by the lesson that in the
hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression
of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.
Prayer exercises in elementary and secondary schools carry a par-
ticular risk of indirect coercion.' 79 Even though a student who
objects to such prayers is technically free to opt out of her gradu-
ation ceremony, according to Justice Kennedy, it does not mean
175. Michael W. McConnell, Equal Treatment and Religious Discrimination,
in EQUAL TREATMENT IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY, supra note 156, at 33.
176. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
177. The Court in Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents writes, "[Tihe First Amend-
ment does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom
.... 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The Court asserts in School District v. Schempp:
The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus
stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful
sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and relig-
ious functions or a concert of dependency of one upon the other to
the end that official support of the State or Federal Government
would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
178. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
179. Id. at 578; see also Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. 203; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
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that she is not being coerced to attend, for the student's absence
from her graduation "would require forfeiture of those tangible
benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all
her high school years."' 0 Thus, "a school rule which excuses
attendance is beside the point."'81
The coercion test is important to the legal case for permit-
ting or requiring the teaching of ID in public schools, for it rests
on the same principle from which Justice Kennedy reasoned in
Lee the state may not use the coercive power of government to
enforce a particular religious or antireligious orthodoxy. This
principle applies to the curricular case for ID for the following
two reasons (combined, not separate).
First, school attendance-in virtually every jurisdiction-is
mandatory, an act of government coercion. Although parents
may choose to send their children to private secular or religious
schools, they may only do so if they are financially able, for public
schools do not charge tuition to their students. Thus, public
school attendance-though not formally or directly coercive-is
practically and indirectly coercive, for families are financially bur-
dened if they choose to send their children to private secular or
religious schools. Therefore, to paraphrase Justice Kennedy,
absence from the public school would require a student's family
to forfeit those tangible resources that could go to the purchase
of other important familial benefits that the student will not have
the opportunity to enjoy (e.g., a larger home, better computers,
better foods, better vacations, better health care).
Second, if a public school curriculum teaches students one
point of view on origins-evolution-"it may appear to the
nonbeliever or dissenter," i.e., the believer in ID, "to be an
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a relig-
ious [or antireligious] orthodoxy."'8 2 Thus, both of the compo-
nents the Court found troubling in Lee are present here:
mandatory attendance (i.e., coercion) and instruction in an
orthodoxy.
Although Lee dealt with a graduation prayer and not a cur-
riculum, its guiding principle is clearly applicable to the case for
teaching ID in public schools: the state may not use the coercive
power of government to enforce a particular religious or antire-
ligious orthodoxy. Therefore, permitting or requiring public
schools to teach the alternative to evolution-Intelligent
180. Lee, 505 U.S. at 595.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 592.
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Design-would be a way to ensure that the Establishment Clause
is not violated via the coercion test.
One objection to this analysis is that the coercion test was
applied by the Court to a formal religious exercise, e.g., a bene-
diction or invocation prayer, and thus, may not apply to a curric-
ulum.'8 3 This objection, however, misses the point of principle
that Justice Kennedy was trying to convey. His point, it seems to
me, does not depend on the particular type of activity for which
government coercion is employed, but rather, whether that activ-
ity is a case in which the state is employing its coercive powers to
enforce a particular orthodoxy. After all, if a public school, as
part of a new relaxation and meditation curriculum, were teach-
ing its students, who were forbidden from opting out of the class,
how to pray to the Christian God-though never actually requir-
ing its teachers to lead their students in prayer-it is difficult to
see why this required curriculum would not violate the coercion
test. Admittedly, the Court may not want to extend the coercion
test in this direction, for it has other tests at its disposal that have
worked just as well when applied to school curriculum. However,
it seems to me that applying the coercion test to public school
curricula is defensible and its case persuasive, especially given the
principle on which the test is based.
Public education is special and parents in a liberal democ-
racy have certain expectations of religious neutrality and fairness
when they send their children to public schools. Parents, accord-
ing to the Court, have a pre-political right to educate their chil-
dren, reflected in the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. 184
183. According to this interpretation, an activity sponsored by a public
school violates the First Amendment when "(1) the government directs (2) a
formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of the
objectors." Jones v. Clear Creek Ind. Sch. Dist., 277 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir.
1992).
184. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relat-
ing to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education .... These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (the right to educate
one's children is not literally in the Bill of Rights, but rather, is a fundamental
pre-political liberty protected by the First Amendment); Pierce v. Soc'y of the
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.");
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (the Fourteenth Amendment's
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(C) Exposing Students to New and Important Scholarship
A state could appeal to the importance of exposing students
to reputable scholarship that critiques the methodological natu-
ralism behind evolution and the ontological materialism entailed
by it. The Edwards Court maintains that its holding does "not
imply that the legislature could never require that scientific criti-
ques of prevailing scientific theories be taught." '185 The Court
asserts that "teaching a variety of scientific theories about the ori-
gins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with
the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science
instruction."' 86 In addition, the Court points out, with apparent
approval, that the unconstitutional Balanced-Treatment Act was
unnecessary because the state of Louisiana already did not pro-
hibit teachers from introducing students to alternative points of
view. 8 7
After all, as noted above, ID proponents have had their
works published by prestigious presses and in academic journals,
have aired their views among critics in the corridors of major uni-
versities and other institutions, and have been recognized
by leading periodicals, both academic and non-academic.
Moreover, there are published peer-reviewed works (1986-
2001) by non-ID scientists that raise questions about, and pose
challenges to, aspects of evolution in three areas of study from
which some ID proponents begin their case: 188 questions of
due process clause guarantees parents' right to perform their duty to educate
their children: "Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of
the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life . . ."
185. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987).
186. Id. at 594.
187. According to the Court, Louisiana's Balanced-Treatment Act did not
give teachers any more academic freedom than what they already had in sup-
planting "the present science curriculum with the presentation of theories,
besides evolution, about the origin of life." Id. at 587. Because "[t]he Act pro-
vides Louisiana school teachers with no new authority[,] ... the stated purpose
is not furthered by it." Id. The Court of Appeals made a similar observation. See
Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985) (Aguillard III).
188. The citations in the following three notes come from a list of publi-
cations and their summaries submitted on March 11, 2002 by Stephen C. Meyer
and Jonathan Wells to the Ohio Board of Education in support of the modifica-
tions of its science curriculum. DiscovERY INST., BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SUPPLEMEN-
TARY RESOURCES FOR OHIO SCIENCE INSTRUCTION (2002), available at http://
ww.discovery.org/viewDB/index.php3?/program=crSC%2OResponses&com-
mand=view&id=l127 (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy). Meyer and Wells are careful to say that "the publications are not
presented either as support for the theory of intelligent design, or as indicating
that the authors cited doubt evolution." Id.
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pattern,189 questions of process,"' and questions about the
189. According to the Discovery Institute staff, pattern "concerns the
large-scale geometry of biological history: how are organisms related to each
other, and how do we know that?" DISCOVERY INST., supra note 188; see PeterJ.
Lockhart & Sydney A. Cameron, Trees for Bees, 16 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLU-
TION 84 (2001); Kenneth Weiss, We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident, 10 EVOLU-
TIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 199 (2001); W. Ford Doolittle, The Nature of the
Universal Ancestor and the Evolution of the Proteome, 10 CURRENT OPINION IN STRUC-
TURAL BIOLOGY 355 (2000); W. Ford Doolittle, Uprooting the Tree of Life, Sci. AM.,
Feb. 2000, at 90; Trisha Gura, Bones, Molecules . .. or Both? 406 NATURE 230
(2000); Simon Conway Morris, Evolution: Bringing Molecules into the Fold, 100
CELL (2000); W. Ford Doolittle, Phylogenetic Classification and the Universal Tree,
284 SCIENCE 2124 (1999); Michael S.Y. Lee, Molecular Clock Calibrations and Meta-
zoan Divergence Dates, 49J. OF MOLECULAR EVOLUTION 385 (1999); Michael S.Y.
Lee, Molecular Phylogenies Become Functional, 14 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION
177 (1999); Detlef F. Leipe et al., Did DNA Replication Evolve Twice Independently ?,
27 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 3389 (1999); ing Cao et al., Conflict Among Individual
Mitochondrial Proteins in Resolving the Phylogeny of Eutherian Orders, 47 J. OF MOLEC-
ULAR EVOLUTION 307 (1998); David P. Mindell et al., Multiple Independent Origins
of Mitochondrial Gene Order in Birds, 95 PROC. OF THE NAT'L AcAD. OF SCI. 10693
(1998); Arcady R. Mushegian et al., Large-Scale Taxonomic Profiling of Eukaryotic
Model Organisms: A Comparison of Orthologous Proteins Encoded by the Human, Fly,
Nematode, and Yeast Genomes, 8 GENOME RES. 590 (1998); Gavin P. Naylor & Wes-
ley M. Brown, Amphioxus Mitochondrial DNA, Chordate Phylogeny, and the Limits of
Inference Based on Comparisons of Sequences, 47 SYSTEMATIC BIOLOGY 61 (1998);
Kensal E. van Holde, Respiratory Proteins of Invertebrates: Structure, Function and
Evolution, 100 ZOOLOGY. ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS 287 (1998); Carl Woese,
The Universal Ancestor, 95 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ScI. 6854 (1998);
Michael K. Richardson et al., There Is No Highly Conserved Embryonic State in the
Vertebrates: limplications for Current Theories of Evolution and Development, 196 ANAT-
OMy & EMBRYOLOGY 91 (1997); W. Ford Doolittle, At the Core of the Archaea, 93
PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 8797 (1996); W. Ford Doolittle, Tempo, Mode,
the Progenote, and the Universal Root, in TEMPO AND MODE IN EVOLUTION 3 (W.
Fitch & F. Ayala eds., 1995); Douglas H. Erwin, Early Introduction of Major Mor-
phological Innovations, ACTA PALAEONTOLOGICA POLONICA 38 (1994); Colin Pat-
terson et al., Congruence Between Molecular and Morphological Phylogenies, 24 ANN.
REV. OF ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 153 (1993); Paul Morris & Emily Cobabe,
Cuvier Meets Watson and Crick; the Utility of Molecules as Classical Homologies, 94
BIOLOGICALJ. OF THE LINNEAN Soc'Y 307 (1991).
190. Process "concerns the mechanisms of evolution, and open problems
in that area." DISCOVERY INST., supra note 188; see Scott F. Gilbert et al., Morpho-
genesis of the Turtle Shell: The Development of a Novel Structure in Tetrapod Evolution,
3 EVOLUTION & DEV. 47 (2001); Olivier Rieppel, Turtles as Hopeful Monsters, 23
BIoESSAYS 987 (2001); Barbel M.R. Stadler et al., The Topology of the Possible: For-
mal Spaces Underlying Patterns of Evolutionary Change, 213 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
241 (2001); Ginther P. Wagner, What is the Promise of Developmental Evolution?
Part II: A Causal Explanation of Evolutionary Innovations May Be Impossible, 291 J.
EXPERIMENTAL ZOOLOGY 305 (2001); Robert L. Carroll, Towards a New Evolution-
ary Synthesis, 15 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 27 (2000); Douglas Erwin, Mac-
roevolution is More Than Repeated Rounds of Microevolution, 2 EVOLUTION & DEV. 78
(2000); Neil H. Shubin & Charles R. Marshall, Fossils, Genes, and the Origin of
Novelty, in DEEP TIME 324 (Douglas H. Erwin & Scott L. Wing eds., 2000); Scott
F. Gilbert et al., Resynthesizing Evolutionary and Developmental Biology, 173 DEVEL-
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central issue (i.e., the origin and nature of biological complex-
ity). 1
9 1
(D) Furthering and Protecting Academic Freedom
A state could also make the argument that an ID statute
enhances and protects the academic freedom of teachers and
students who may suffer marginalization, hostility, and public rid-
icule because of their support of ID and/or doubts about the
veracity of the evolutionary paradigm.' 92 This is not as far-
fetched as one may think. Consider just the following examples.
(1) Historian Ronald L. Numbers relates how "one annoyed
critic no doubt captured the feelings of many when he described
[ID] as 'the same old creationist bullshit dressed up in new
clothes." 193 Numbers cites a few more examples:
When the Jewish magazine Commentary in 1996 published a
version of ID theory by the mathematician and novelist
David Berlinski, letters of protest poured onto the editor's
desk. [Daniel] Dennett ridiculed Berlinski's stylish essay as
OPMENTAL BIOLOGY 357 (1996); George L. Gabor Miklos, Emergence of Organiza-
tional Complexities During Metazoan Evolution: Perspectives from Molecular Biology,
Palaeontology and Neo-Darwinism, MEM. Ass. AuSTRALAS. PALAEONTOLS 15 (1993);
Keith Stewart Thomson, Macroevolution: The Morphological Problem, 23 AM. ZooL-
OGIST 106 (1992).
191. Biological complexity "concerns the origin of what makes organisms
distinctively what they are: the source of the specified complexity of biological
information." DISCOVERY INST., supra note 188. See MICHAELJ. KATZ, TEMPLETS
AND THE EXPLANATION OF COMPLEX PATTERNS (1986) (first usage of the term
"irreducible complexity" 10 years prior to Behe's use of it); Philip Ball, Life's
Lessons In Design, NATURE 409 (2001); Rodney Brooks, The Relationship Between
Matter And Life, NATURE 409 (2001); Scott N. Peterson & Claire M. Fraser, The
Complexity of Simplicity, GENOME BIOLOGY 2 (2001); Eugene V. Koonin, How Many
Genes Can Make a Cell: The Minimal-Gene-Set Concept, ANN. REv. GENOMICS AND
HUMAN GENETICS 1 (2000); Leslie E. Orgel, Self-Organizing Biochemical Cycles, 97
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 12,503 (2000); E6rs Szarthmiry, The Evolution of Repli-
cators, 355 PHIL. TRANsSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON 1669 (2000); Clyde A.
Hutchison et al., Global Transposon Mutagenesis and a Minimal Mycoplasma Gen-
ome, SCIENCE 286 (1999); David W. Deamer, The First Living Systems: A Bioenergetic
Perspective, MICROBIOLOGY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY REv. 61 (1997);Jack Maniloff,
The Minimal Cell Genome: 'On Being the Right Size, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCi.
10,004 (1996); Arcady R. Mushegian & Eugene V. Koonin, A Minimal Gene Set
For Cellular Life Derived By Comparison of Complete Bacterial Genomes, 93 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 10,268 (1996); Claire M. Fraser et al., The Minimal Gene Com-
plement of Mycoplasma genitalium, SCIENCE 270 (1995).
192. Justice Scalia, in his Edwards dissent, makes this argument in refer-
ence to Creationists. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 630-36 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. NUMBERS, supra note 2, at 20 (quoting David K. Webb, Letter to the
Editor, 5 ORIGINS & DESIGN 5 (1996)).
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"another hilarious demonstration that you can publish
bull[shi]t at will-just as long as you say what an editorial
board wants to hear in a style it favors." Another reader
characterized Berlinski's "intuitions about the Design of
the World as neither more nor less reliable than those of
flat-earthers, goat entrail-readers, or believers in the Oedi-
pus complex."'
94
(2) In 1999 the state board of education in Kansas revised
its standards for the teaching of evolution in its public schools.
9 5
The revisions included the modest, and defensible, claims that
natural selection adds no new genetic information 196 and that
science is defined as the "human activity of seeking logical expla-
nations for what we observe in the world around us."' 9 7 The stan-
dards also implied that microevolution does not entail
macroevolution.1 9 s The board did not require the teaching of
Creationism or Intelligent Design. It merely suggested that science
teachers present the deliverances of their disciplines, on the mat-
ter of evolution, with tentativeness and modesty. It did not, for
example, mandate that the state's teachers instruct their students
that microevolution entails macroevolution, though teachers
194. Id. (quoting Daniel Dennett & Karl F. Wessel, Denying Darwin: David
Berlinski and Critics, COMMENTARY 6, 11 (Sept. 1996)).
195. For an analysis sympathetic to the school board's revisions, PHILLIP
E.JoHNSON, THE WEDGE OF TRUTH: SPLITTING THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURALISM
63-83 (2000). For an analysis more critical and less polemical than Johnson's,
see Marjorie George, Note, And Then God Created Kansas?: The Evolution/Crea-
tionism Debate in America's Public Schools, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 843 (2001).
196. KAN. STATE BD. OF EDUC., KANSAS CURRICULAR STANDARDS FOR SCI-
ENCE EDUCATION 38 (Dec. 7, 1999) [hereinafter KANSAS I].
197. Id. at 71. This suggestion was intended to teach the lesson that sci-
ence is fundamentally about arguments and evidence and not about excluding
non-naturalistic points of view a priori. In other words, the board intended to
exclude methodological naturalism as a necessary precondition of science and
ontological materialism as an entailment. See JOHN H. CALVERT & WILLIAM S.
HARRIS, INTELLIGENT DESIGN NETWORK, TEACHING ORIGINS SCIENCE IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (2001), at http://www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org/legalopinion.
htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
198. KANsAS I, supra note 196, at 37, 69. Macroevolution is the view that the
complex diversity of living things in our world, through small, incremental and
beneficial mutations over long eons of time, are all the result of one bacterial
cell. That is, all living beings share a common ancestor, giving the appearance
of being designed though in reality engineered by the unintelligent forces of
natural selection. Microevolution is the view that biological species adapt over
time to changing environments and pass on those adaptations genetically to
their offspring; evolution in this sense simply refers to "limited variation within
fixed boundaries." DEMBSKI, supra note 25, at 113, which differs from macro-
evolution, "the unlimited capacity of organisms to transform beyond all bound-
aries." Id. at 250.
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were free to do so if they wanted to. Moreover, these standards
were "explicitly not binding on local school boards as an official
curriculum," but were "designed to assist in the development of
local curriculum by presenting the 'benchmarks' by which stu-
dents will ultimately be evaluated on mandatory standardized
tests."' 199 But the board's suggestion did not sit well with many
who saw the revisions as the first step in a slippery slope back to
the Dayton, Tennessee of 1925. The following are a few of the
comments made about and to the Kansas school board as well as
the state's citizens. 0°
The editor of Scientific American, John Rennie, sounding like
Tony Soprano giving orders to his lieutenants, instructed mem-
bers of college or university admission boards to
please contact the Kansas State Board of Education or the
office of [the] Governor .... [and] [m]ake it clear that in
light of the newly lowered education standards in Kansas,
the qualifications of any students applying from that state
in the future will have to be considered very carefully. Send
a clear message to the parents in Kansas that this bad deci-
sion carries consequences for their children.
20 1
Washington Post columnist Gene Weingarten depicted God
saying to the Kansas school board, "It]hank you for your sup-
port" and then instructing them
to go forth and multiply. Beget many children. And yea,
your children shall beget children. And their children shall
beget children, and their children's children after them.
And in time the genes that have made you such pinheads
will be eliminated through natural selection. Because that
is how it works. 20 2
The British writer A. N. Wilson called the entire U.S. Midwest the
"land of born again bone heads."2°1 "[N] early all" of the reasona-
199. Lisa D. Kirkpatrick, Note, Forgetting the Lessons of History: The Evolution
of Creationism and Current Trends to Restrict the Teaching of Evolution in Public
Schools, 49 DRui E L. REV. 125, 126 (2000).
200. The Kansas school board's controversial revisions were removed in
February 2001, as a result of a new election in which voters replaced members
of the board that had supported the revisions. See KAN. STATE BD. OF EDUC.,
KANSAS SCIENCE EDUCATION STANDARDS (2001), available at http://www.ksde.
org/outcomes/science (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy) [hereinafter KANSAS II].
201. John Rennie, A Total Eclipse of Reason, Scl. Ari., Oct. 1, 1999, at 124.
202. Gene Weingarten, And So God Says to Charles Darwin: Let There Be
Light in Kansas, J. & COURIER, Aug. 17, 1999, at A5.
203. A. N. Wilson, Land of the Born Again Bone Heads, EVENING STANDARD,
Aug. 13, 1999, at 13, available at 1999 WL 23722898.
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ble people in America are "living on the eastern seaboard and in
the big cities," Wilson opines. But in places like Kansas
the stupidity and insularity of the people is quite literally
boundless. . . .These are people who believe that Elvis
Presley has risen from the dead or that President Clinton
repented of his sins and never looked at another bimbo
since Monica. Their simple, idiotic credulity as a populace
would have been the envy of Lenin.20 4
(3) In 1999, a Burlington, Washington, high school biology
teacher, Roger DeHart, was instructed by his superiors, as a result
of a student complaint filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), to "drop references to design and stick to the
textbook. '20 5 In 2001, "DeHart was told he could not even intro-
duce materials questioning Darwin's theories, "206 something he
had been doing for over nine years until the 1999 incident.
207
Although no one disputes that Mr. DeHart taught the required
curriculum correctly, and although he never mentioned God, he
nevertheless was accused of the Socratic transgression of encour-
aging his pupils to think deeply and thoughtfully about the philo-
sophical implications that flow from the Darwinian paradigm.
According to a report in the Los Angeles Times, DeHart "dissected
such scientific topics as bacterial flagella, fossil records and
embryonic development. Examine the evidence, he told the stu-
dents, and ponder the Big Question: Is life the result of random,
meaningless events? Or was it designed by an intelligent
force?"208
Mr. DeHart's story may be just the beginning of a political
and legal melee about the nature of academic freedom in public
schools and whether that liberty extends to those who embrace
what a majority of their peers are convinced is metaphysical her-
esy. For instance, the 2001 Kansas science standards define sci-
ence as " [t] he human activity of seeking natural explanations for
what we observe in the world around us,"209 in contrast to the
1999 standards that define science as the "human activity of seek-
ing logical explanations ....210 Of course, in the debate over ori-
gins, dem are fightin' words. Hence, in a press release issued by
204. Id.
205. Watanabe, supra note 23. For a less sympathetic narrative of Mr.
DeHart's predicament, see John Gibeaut, Evolution of a Controversy, 85 A.B.A. J.
50 (1999).
206. Watanabe, supra note 23.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. KANSAS II, supra note 200, at 97 (emphasis added).
210. KANSAS I, supra note 196, at 71 (emphasis added).
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the Discovery Institute, Mark Edwards, an Intelligent Design
spokesperson, replies that
[t]he [2001] Kansas decision to impose naturalism on stu-
dents in the name of science will not end the new debate
over life's origins .... What is heralded as the triumph of
science is instead a victory for censorship and viewpoint
discrimination. This is not what science, or America, is
about; discussion of the dissenting scientific opinion on
Darwinism should be allowed in science classrooms. 211
(4) Some university professors, who have embraced ID,
have tested the limits to which academic freedom will be
extended at their open and tolerant institutions that celebrate
diversity. Design theorist and Baylor University mathematician
and philosopher, Dembski, whose academic credentials and pub-
lications are of the highest quality, 212 "was stripped of his direc-
torship of a new campus institute on intelligent design after
holding a controversial conference on the issue, '"23 which
included among its participants M.I.T. physicist Alan Guth,
Berkeley philosopher John Searle, and University of Texas physi-
cist Steven Weinberg, a Nobel Prize-winner. 21 4 The university
alleges that Dembski was demoted because of his lack of
collegiality.215
In another case, Dean Kenyon, a senior biology professor at
San Francisco State University and co-author of the well-known
text on the origin of life, Biochemical Predestination,2 1 6 "was
removed from teaching biology by his department chairman in
1992 after criticizing Darwin's theories, but was reinstated by a
vote of the Academic Senate."217 According to an article in the
Los Angeles Times, "other scientists report receiving correspon-
211. 'Kansas Decision on Evolution is Censorship,' Says Discovery Institute, An
Intelligent Design Think Tank, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WL
4140006.
212. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 20.
213. Watanabe, supra note 23; see also Tony Carries, Design Interference: Wil-
liam Dembski Fired From Baylor, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Dec. 4, 2000, available at
2000 WL 11062939.
214. Nancy Pearcey, We're Not In Kansas Anymore, CHRISTIANTy TODAY,
May 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL 11062678.
215. "The university says Dembski was removed because of uncollegial
behavior, not the content of his work; Dembski continues his design research at
Baylor as an associate research professor." Watanabe, supra note 23.
216. DEAN KENYON & GARY STEINMAN, BIOCHEMICAL PREDESTINATION
(1969). Kenyon has since repudiated the materialism he presupposed in this
text. See PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE: THE CENTRAL
QUESTION OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS (2d ed. 1993).
217. Watanabe, supra note 23.
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dence from colleagues who confess doubts about Darwin's theo-
ries but are afraid to go public for fear of career setbacks." '218
The Supreme Court has affirmed that a teacher engages in
protected speech under the rubric of academic freedom (and thus
the First Amendment) when she brings into the classroom rele-
vant material that is supplementary to the curriculum (and not a
violation of any other legal duties) and she has adequately ful-
filled all of her curricular obligations.219 Given that, it seems to
me that any government body that passed legislation to protect
the academic freedom of teachers and students to discuss in the
classroom scientific alternatives to evolution, including design
theory, would simply be affirming by statute or written policy
what is already a fixed point in Constitutional law.
ii. Religious Motivation and the Statute's Means-End Relationship
Since an ID statute likely would have citizen and legislative
supporters whose public comments would sound like they are
motivated exclusively by a desire to advance their own religious
beliefs, this must be addressed in any proposed statute.
First, the statute can appeal to the secular reasons found
elsewhere in the statute's text, such as the ones suggested above.
As we have seen, the presence of a religious motivation or pur-
pose is not fatal; but the absence of a secular purpose is.
218. Id.
219. For example, the Court writes,
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teach-
ers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional free-
doms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools."
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). In Epperson v. Arkansas, the Court asserts:
Our courts ... have not failed to apply the First Amendment's man-
date in our educational system where essential to safeguard the funda-
mental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief. By and
large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of
state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the
resolution of conflicts which arise in daily operation of school systems
and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional
values .... The Court . . . [has] acknowledged the State's power to
prescribe the school curriculum, but it held [in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)] that these were not adequate to support the restric-
tion upon the liberty of teacher and pupil.
393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968); see Francis J. Beckwith, A Liberty Not Fully Evolved?:
The Case of Rodney LeVake and the Right of Public School Teachers to Criticize Darwin-
ism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1311 (2002).
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Second, the statute's drafters may want to address the ques-
tion of motivation head on by making both a philosophical and
case law argument against the use of it in evaluating a statute's
purpose.220 Both Justice Black's concurring opinion in Epper-
son 921 as well as Justice Scalia's dissent in Edwards222 are places in
which one can find the case law and the jurisprudential argu-
ments.22 Third, a legislature would have to be circumspect in its
articulation and crafting of an ID statute so its means-end rela-
tionship is clear. For example, in Edwards the Louisiana legisla-
ture made the mistake of appealing to academic freedom when
in fact the statute limited the freedom of teachers.224 A legislature
can avoid such mistakes by carefully evaluating its proposed stat-
ute in light of criticisms of the statutes struck down in Epperson,
McLean, and Edwards.
220. For example, my motivation for defending the Free Exercise Clause
may be religious; that is, I support it because it affords me the opportunity to
convert others to my faith. Nevertheless, I publicly announce to my fellow citi-
zens, with all sincerity, that the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to allow
religious liberty to people from all faiths including ones hostile to mine. Yet, it
would seem foolish to argue that based on my motivation one may reasonably
infer that the Free Exercise Clause's "real" purpose is to advance my sectarian
beliefs and thus, paradoxically, one may conclude that the Free Exercise Clause
violates the Establishment Clause.
In order to appreciate the logical fallaciousness of such reasoning, suppose
that someone defends the Free Exercise Clause because she is motivated by a
desire for religious liberty. And, like me, she publicly announces to her fellow
citizens, with all sincerity, that the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to
allow religious liberty to people from all faiths including ones hostile to hers.
Her motivation, unlike mine, coincides with the clause's purpose. But since the
text and announced purpose of the Free Exercise Clause in each scenario are
identical to those found in the other, it would seem that the motivation of its
supporters is at best a curiosity and at worst a logically fallacious basis for dis-
carding a statute. It is interesting to note that "the distinction between motive
and purpose is elementary in criminal law." Whether or not a defendant is
guilty does not depend whether he was motivated by beneficence or malevo-
lence, but rather, "whether he acted with the purpose of accomplishing a par-
ticular result." DeWolf, supra note 162, at 461.
221. Epperson, 393 U.S. 97, 109-14 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
222. Edwards, 482 U.S. 578, 634-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223. See also DeWolf's outstanding analysis on this matter. DeWolf, supra
note 162, at 461-62.
224. "Under the Act's requirements, teachers who were once free to
teach any and all facets of this subject are now unable to do so." Edwards, 482
U.S. at 588-89. Moreover, "[T] he Act fails even to ensure that creation science
will be taught, but instead requires the teaching of this theory only when the
theory of evolution is taught." Id. at 589.
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3. One Final Objection
There is one final objection that one may raise against the
teaching of ID in public schools:2 2 5 Because some ID theorists
describe the designer in language that is explicitly theological,226
and others describe it in language that is implicitly theological,
22 7
and because the courts have said that the concept of God is
inherently religious,22 therefore, even if ID is scientifically
sound,22 9 the Establishment Clause forbids the teaching of it in
public schools.
There are at least three problems with this argument. First,
one could agree that the courts have consistently held that the
concept of God is inherently religious, but that they are simply
mistaken. For the courts ignore the case made by some scholars
225. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 129, at 457-68. According to Aguillard v.
Edwards,
[The district court below] reasoned that the doctrine of creation-sci-
ence necessarily entailed teaching the existence of a divine creator
and the concept of a creator was an inherently religious tenet. The
court thus held that the purpose of the Act was to promote religion
and the implementation of the Act would have the effect of establish-
ing religion.
765 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1985). In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court writes:
"[T]he term 'creation science,' as contemplated by the [Louisiana] legislature
that adopted this Act, embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator
was responsible for the creation of humankind." Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592.
226. For example, Moreland speaks of ID as "theistic science." See More-
land, supra note 27. Ross believes his design argument is an adequate proof for
God's existence. See Ross, Big Bang Refined by Fire, supra note 67. Craig maintains
that his kalamcosmological argument establishes the existence of a non-mate-
rial, personal, all-powerful creator of the world. See Craig, Naturalism and Cos-
mology, in NATURALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYsis, supra note 20. Johnson talks of
'theistic realism" as an alternative to materialist science. SeeJOHNSON, supra note
26 at 89-110.
227. Davis and Kenyon maintain that they are not arguing for a "supreme
being," but rather, for an "agent," "cause," or "designer" who "devised" the
blueprint for "creating" life. DAvis & KENYON, supra note 216. DeWolf, Meyer
and DeForrest assert that "[d]esign theory, unlike neo-Darwinism, attributes
this appearance to a designing intelligence, but it does not address the charac-
teristics or identity of the designing intelligence." DeWolf et al., supra note 21,
at 85.
228. "The argument advanced by defendants' witness, Dr. Norman Gei-
sler, that teaching the existence of God is not religious unless the teaching
seeks a commitment, is contrary to common understanding and contradicts set-
tled case law." McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Ark.
1982) (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963)).
229. "The First Amendment forbids the government from establishing
religion; it does not require it to teach science.... [A]s a constitutional matter,
the question of whether... [ID] is science ultimately turns out not to be a very
important question at all." Wexler, supra note 129, at 468.
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that "God" need not always be a religious concept, for "God" can
be employed as a theoretical postulate without being an object of
worship.23° Since the Supreme Court has shifted and expanded
its view of religion over the past 150 years due to America's
increasing religious diversity and new insights about the nature
of religion, there is no reason why it could not change again. If
the Supreme Court in Equal Protection cases can discard opin-
231ions on gender because they are anachronistic, it certainly can
do the same with outdated definitions of religion.
Second, even if one were to concede that the concept of
God is inherently religious, and that the designer in ID is explic-
itly or implicitly theistic, it does not follow that ID cannot be
taught in public schools. ID could be taught for any or all of the
secular reasons listed above, for a religious belief is constitution-
ally barred from the classroom only if the teaching of it has no
secular purpose.
Third, it seems reasonable to argue that ID is a research pro-
gram whose inferences support, and are consistent with, some
belief in a higher intelligence or deity; it is not a creed that con-
tains belief in a specific deity as one of its tenets. To use an anal-
ogy, evolution is a research program whose inferences support,
and are consistent with, atheism; it is not a creed that includes
unbelief in God as one of its tenets. So, if a scientific research
program is "religious" because it supports and is consistent with a
belief in a higher intelligence or deity, it would follow that a
research program is "irreligious" because it supports and is con-
sistent with the non-existence of such a being.
In sum, if the concept of God is not inherently religious,
then ID cannot be barred from public school classrooms for
230. See supra notes 118-21. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Edwards, cor-
rectly points out that the notion of a designer or prime mover, as found in
ancient Greek thought, was not religious. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 629-30
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. For example, in Goesaert v. Cleary, the Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of a Michigan statute that did not permit female bartenders unless they
were the male owner's wife or daughter. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). However, in
Craig v. Boren, the Court held that an Oklahoma statute that had different mini-
mal drinking ages for males and females violates equal protection. The Court
writes in Craig, that
[i]nsofar as Goesaert, may be inconsistent, that decision is disapproved.
Undoubtedly reflecting the view that Goesaert's equal protection analy-
sis no longer obtains, the District Court made no reference to that
decision in upholding Oklahoma's statute. Similarly, the opinions of
the federal and state courts cited earlier in the text invalidating gen-
der lines with respect to alcohol regulation uniformly disparaged the
contemporary vitality of Goesaert.
429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976) (citations omitted).
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establishment reasons merely because the designer is God; if the
concept of God is inherently religious, and the designer in ID is
implicitly or explicitly theistic, then ID may still be taught in pub-
lic schools, based on the secular reasons listed above; and if ID is
theistic and hence religious because it supports and is consistent
with God's existence, then evolution is "irreligious" because it
supports and is consistent with God's non-existence, but that
would mean that the courts should treat evolution like ID.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to answer the question of
whether Intelligent Design would pass constitutional muster if it
were permitted or required to be part of a public school's curric-
ulum. In order to answer this question, I first covered the rise of,
and case for, ID, showing that ID-in contrast to the Creationism
repudiated by the Supreme Court and other federal courts-is a
serious challenge to the evolutionary paradigm. It is offered by
well-credentialed scholars who have published their views in aca-
demic journals and monographs as well as in anthologies with
prestigious university press imprints. I then assessed the question
of whether ID is a religion, concluding that it is neither a conven-
tional religion nor a religion according to the parallel position
test (PPT). I also argued that ID would pass the Edwards stan-
dard, the test offered by the Supreme Court to forbid the
required teaching of Creationism in public schools. For, unlike
Creationism, ID is neither historically connected to Scopes nor is
its literature replete with "science" and curricula that are trans-
parent attempts to require that public schools offer to their stu-
dents an account of origins derived from the Book of Genesis. I
then offered four secular reasons to which a government body
may appeal if it seeks to require or permit ID to be taught in its
public schools: an endorsement test justification, a neutrality test
justification, exposing students to new and important scholar-
ship, and furthering and protecting academic freedom. I also
suggested that any government body that entertained such legis-
lation must be circumspect in presenting its case in a secular
fashion with a clear and defensible means-end relationship. I
concluded by addressing the objection that because the designer
in ID is explicitly or implicitly theological, the Establishment
Clause forbids it from being taught in public school science clas-
ses. Thus, given the above judgments, it is clear that Intelligent
Design would pass constitutional muster if it were permitted or
required to be part of a public school's curriculum. There may
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be good public policy reasons not to teach ID in public schools,
but there are no good constitutional reasons.
The debate over origins-from Scopes to Edwards to the pre-
sent day-is one that touches on some deep and important phil-
osophical and scientific questions about the nature of the
universe, knowledge, religion, and liberty. In a society of contrary
and contradictory religious and philosophical points of view, the
law must address, with fairness and consistency, how public
schools ought to deal with the question of origins without violat-
ing both the deliverances of science and the rights of the
Nation's citizens.
The infusion of Intelligent Design into this debate has
changed the legal landscape significantly. Unlike the Creation-
ism repudiated by the Supreme Court in Epperson and Edwards,
ID cannot be dismissed as a transparent attempt on the part of
religious people to force their views on the public schools.
Instead, ID advocates, if their case reaches our highest courts,
will force even our most cerebral jurists, to carefully and consci-
entiously assess a jurisprudence that up until now could be-
without fear of serious inspection-papered-over with the carica-
ture of William Jennings Bryan trying to figure out where Cain
found his wife. This quasi-official, "Inherit the Wind," caricature
has outlived its usefulness. It has, to enlist a bad pun, not evolved.
ID is not your Daddy's fundamentalism.
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